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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSUASIBILITY
Overview
Social psychologists have been studying the persuasion process for decades by
dissecting persuasive situations into the basic components of the source, the message,
the audience, the medium, and the effect (Lasswell, 1948), and by placing each of
these components under the research microscope. Hundreds of studies have brought
into sharper focus our understanding of how different sources, different messages, and
different media affect the development and change of attitudes.
Our understanding of one component, however, remains largely blurred. That
component is the audience, and what remains out of focus is our understanding of
individual differences in attitude formation and change. Relative to their research
interest in the source and the content of the message, social psychologists have shown
little interest in what makes individuals respond differently to a given message. This
is unfortunate because as long as our understanding of the audience remains out of
focus, social psychologists may never get a clear picture of attitudes and attitude
change.
One of the earliest attempts to integrate the many different components of
persuasion was put forward Janis and Hovland (1959).

Using Lasswell's (1948)

framework, Janis and Hovland painted a model of persuasion in which changes in

1

2
attitudes are affected by 1) communication stimuli (such as the characteristics of the
communicator or the content of the message), 2) predispositional factors of the
individual audience member (such as an entrenched attitude or a wavering personality), and 3) internal mediating processes (such as the listener's attention, comprehension and acceptance of the message).
A major element of the Janis and Hovland (1959) model, and the focus of this
paper, is the notion that some people, regardless of what is being argued, are
consistently more open to persuasion than others. Janis and Hovland labeled this
tendency to agree with most persuasive messages "unbounded persuasibility," and
suggested that persuasibility is a stable personality characteristic that causes some
people to be easily persuaded across a variety of situations, and others to remain
highly resistant to most attempts at persuasion.

In formulating the notion of

persuasibility Janis, (1954) claimed that studies
" ... apparently contradict the assumption that individuals exhibit completely
unrelated degrees of susceptibility that are unique to each opinion topic or
to each communication situation. Consequently, there is reason to suspect
that some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be eventually
isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as to how different
individuals will respond to various discrete communications on different
topics" (p. 506).
This quote points to two areas where our understanding of persuasibility is still
cloudy. Janis (1954) envisioned that psychologists eventually would isolate a general
trait of persuasibility, and then be able to predict who is open to persuasion and who
is resistant to persuasion. Yet, decades later only a handful of researchers have tried
to isolate a persuasibility trait, and only occasionally have they been able to make

3
accurate predictions about who will and who will not be persuaded by a variety of
messages.

Therefore, the current study will examine (a) the existence of an

unbounded persuasibility trait, (b) whether individual differences in unbounded
persuasibility can be predicted accurately from several social psychological measures,
and (c) whether paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure unbounded
persuasibility can accurately predict individual differences in persuasibility.

Distinctions Among Different Types of Persuasibility
In discussing how persuasibility might affect the persuasion process, Janis and
Hovland (1959) made an important distinction between "bounded" and "unbounded"
persuasibility factors. According to Janis and Hovland, bounded persuasibility factors
are personality traits that leave a message recipient susceptible a limited range of
persuasive messages. Unbounded factors, on the other hand, are personality factors
that leave a recipient susceptible to an unlimited variety of messages.
Bounded Persuasibility.

Janis and Hovland (1959) proposed several

subdivisions of bounded persuasibility. For instance, they speculate that some personality types may be more persuaded on a particular topic than others. In line with this
topic-bound factor, Cacioppo and Petty (1980) report that men are more persuaded
than women on stereotypically feminine topics (namely, female fashions) while
women are more persuaded than men on stereotypically masculine topics (namely,
- football issues). Janis and Hovland also suggest that some personality types might be
more influenced by a particular style of message, regardless of the topic. Recent
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examples of such content-bound factors include studies showing that high selfmonitors are particularly susceptible to messages that stress "image" over "substance"
(Snyder & DeBono, 1987), and other studies that find people low in "need for
cognition" are unpersuaded by messages that require large amounts of mental
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
The notion that certain people may be susceptible to certain types of
communication is not unique to Janis and Hovland's (1959) vision of bounded
persuasibility. Another early attempt to link personality variables to a limited range
of persuasive messages was put forth in the "functional theories" of attitude change
(see Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). Common to all functional theories
is the assumption that people maintain their attitudes because their attitudes fulfill
some psychological needs. According to Katz, attitudes can serve four basic functions
-- instrumental,

~go-defensive,

value-expressive, and knowledge functions. Attitudes

that serve the instrumental function are maintained because holding the attitude
produces some external benefits.
p~esidential

friends.

For instance, voters may support a liberal

candidate only because of the praise they can receive from like-minded

Attitudes that serve the ego-defensive function, on the other hand, exist

because the outward expression of the attitude might protect a person from unpleasant
inner-truths. For instance, other voters may support the same liberal candidate in
order to repress inner fears that they lack compassion for other people.

Value-

expressive attitudes are maintained in order to advertise personal values. Thus, a
third block of voters may support the liberal candidate as a way of expressing their

5
personal ideologies. Finally, attitudes that serve the knowledge function are held in
order to simplify a complex array of information into a single, efficient mental
structure.

Toward this end, some voters may support the same candidate after

distilling everything they know about the candidate into a single supportive attitude.
Although the functional theories have not generated much research (for a good
example, see Snyder & DeBono, 1987), they have reminded researchers that a
persuasive message will only be effective if its content is targeted toward the specific
function being served by an attitude. Stated another way, a message that presents
cogent, factual information may help change knowledge-based attitudes but would not
change instrumental, ego-defensive, or value-expressive attitudes. An implication of
this for persuasibility is that people will only be open to messages to the extent that
the messages address the functional bases of their attitudes.
Along with the functional theories, the more recent "Person x Situation
interaction" approach (see Kahle, 1984) has been another direct extension of bounded
persuasibility.

According to this approach, a given personality variable might only

affect persuasibility in a narrow range of communication situations. For instance, the
finding that men are easily persuaded on fashion issues but are not easily persuaded
on football issues is consistent with the Person X Situation interaction approach.
Similarly, the finding that high authoritarians are more persuaded by high authority
sources (Berkowitz & Lundy, 1957; Centers, Shomer, & Rodrigues, 1970; Johnson

& Izzett, 1969) is also consistent with the predictions of both the Janis-Hovland model
and the Person X Situation interaction model.
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The Person X Situation interaction model has generated a closer look at the
role of personality in persuasion. And, while some prominent theo.rists (McGuire,
1985; Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) have welcomed the renewed focus on personality
variables, the focus has been limited to bounded persuasibility. Researchers have
focused almost exclusively on how a given personality variable (e.g., self-monitoring
or authoritarianism) affects persuasion within a particular situation or for a certain
kind of message. There has been far less research on the second half of Janis and
Hovland's (1959) persuasibility model -- unbounded persuasibility.
Unbounded Persuasibility. Consistent with the adage that suggests "you can
convince some of the people all of the time," Janis and Hovland (1959) use the
concept of unbounded persuasibility to suggest that there may be some personality
variables that leave a person more (or less) open to persuasion across all situations,
or across all types of messages. Surprisingly, however, the notion of general or
unbounded persuasibility has stayed in the shadows of research on attitude change for
over 30 years with only a small number of researchers venturing a closer look. These
past research efforts have typically approached unbounded persuasibility from one of
three different angles. The first angle has been to explore the strength of unbounded
persuasibility as a personality trait, to see how strongly attitude change on one topic
is related to attitude change on other topics. The second angle has sought personality
variables that can predict unbounded persuasibility across topics. Finally, the third
angle has aimed at devising, and validating relatively simple paper-and-pencil
measures of persuasibility that could be used in place of more cumbersome ways of
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assessing openness to persuasion. Each approach to studying unbounded persuasibility
is discussed below. 1

B. PERSONALITY AND UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY
All of the studies of unbounded persuasibility share a common research strategy
that sets them apart from the more frequent studies of bounded persuasibility. Studies
that investigate how personality variables relate to bounded persuasibility measure
participants' attitudes after exposure to a single message on a single topic. (See Line
A of Figure 1.) Studies that investigate how personality variables relate to unbounded
persuasibility, however, measure attitudes after exposure to messages on several
topics.

"Unbounded persuasibility" is then defined as the amount of persuasion

produced across all of the messages.

(To avoid confusion between bounded and

unbounded persuasibility, the terms "bounded persuasion" and "unbounded
persuasibility" will be used throughout the remainder of this paper.

"Bounded

persuasion" or simply "persuasion" will be reserved for the effects of a single message
on one attitude.

"Unbounded persuasibility" or simply "persuasibility" will be

reserved for the effects of several messages on several attitudes.)

The Strength of the Unbounded Persuasibility Trait
Unbounded persuasibility could only be considered a strong trait if there were
consistently strong correlations between the amount of persuasion produced by one
message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages (see Line B of
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~l======ME=TH==O=D====~'~l========CR==I=T=E=R=I=A==========i'~'=====P=RE==D=I=CT=O=RS=======ill
BOUNDED PERSUASION
Pretest 1 ...
Message 1 ...
Posttest 1

---

STUIDE~

Pretest 1
- Posttest 1
= Persuasion Score 1

r.======U_N.!"BOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY STUDIES=·===="""
1

Pretest 1 ....
Message 1 ....
Posttest 1

- ....

Pretest 1
- Posttest 1
~
~ Persuasion Score 1

Pretest 2 ....
Message 2 ....
Posttest 2

- ....

Pretest 2
- Posttest 2
= Persuasion Score 2

••
•

Pretest n ....
Message n ....
Posttest n

••
•

_....

Pretest n
- Posttest n
-.
= Persuasion Score n

A

~

B

j

INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCE
VARIABLES
(e.g., gender,
self-esteem)

Persuasion Score 1
Persuasion $core 2

••
•

+ Persuasion Score n

= Unbounded

Persuasibil i ty scores

PAPER & PENCIL
PERSUASIBILITY
MEASURES

(PPI and JFPQ)

Figure 1: Characteristics of Persuasibility Studies
Note: Line A represents studies that relate individual difference variables to attitude
change; B represents studies that relate levels of persuasion among multiple topics; C
represents studies that relate individual difference variables to unbounded
persuasibility; and D represents studies that assess the criterion-related validity of
persuasibility measures.
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Figure 1). Janis and his colleagues provided the earliest evidence of an unbounded
persuasibility trait.

In his first study, Janis (1954) exposed undergraduates to

messages on three different topics and found that participants who were persuaded by
one message were moderately more likely to be persuaded by the other two messages.
In a second study, Janis (1955) presented undergraduates with editorials on five topics
and again found a small, but consistent tendency for participants either to change
opinions on all topics or to change none of their opinions. In a third study (Janis &
Field, 1959), high school students read ten editorials, thereby allowing Janis to
correlate ten measures of attitude change. Eighty-seven percent of these correlations
were positive (although not all reached traditional levels of statistical significance),
indicating that the amount of persuasion produced by one editorial was generally
related to the amount of persuasion produced by another editorial.
In the stuqies that followed, other researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz,
1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1977;
Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1970; Touhey, 1973; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker &
f'.1eade, 1967) often found that the best predictor of persuasion on one topic was the
amount of persuasion on other topics. These studies suggest that some people are
generally more open to persuasion than others, and that a disposition toward
unbounded persuasibility plays an important role in determining who does and does
not accept a message.

However, past research also suggests that unbounded

persuasibility does not play a dominant role in the acceptance of a message. When
they are reported, correlations among persuasion scores across topics tend to be
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modest, at best. 2
Overall, past research on unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition
does suggest that some people are moderately more open to persuasive messages
whereas other people are moderately more resistant to persuasive messages. Although
unbounded persuasibility appears to be a modest trait3, the existence of even a modest
trait is surprising. Given that the effect of any one persuasive message depends on
the complex interaction of source, message, style, and bounded recipient factors, it
is surprising that any unbounded persuasibility can be detected.

Individual Difference Correlates of Unbounded Persuasibility
Since Janis first isolated a modest disposition toward unbounded persuasibility,
many researchers have studied how personality variables relate to persuasion.
However, most researchers have studied the effect of personality variables on bounded
persuasion by exposing participants to a single message on a single topic (for recent
reviews, see Kahle, 1984; McGuire, 1968, 1985; Wood & Stangor, in press). Only
relatively rarely have researchers studied the effect of personality variables on
unbounded persuasibility by exposing participants to messages on multiple topics
(Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Janis, 1954,
1955; Janis & Field, 1959; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1981;
Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1965; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & Meade, 1967).
(See Line C of Figure 1.) The individual difference correlates that have generated the
most research are dogmatism, gender, social desirability, self-esteem, and anxiety.
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Dogmatism (Closed-mindedn~). In his seminal work on the topic, Rokeach
(1960) defined dogmatism in a manner that, at first glance, seems counter-intuitive.
Intuitively, most people think of dogmatism as the tendency to be self-opinionated and
to reject all ideas that are not consistent with established beliefs. Counter-intuitively
however, Rokeach defined dogmatism as the tendency to "compartmentalize" one's
beliefs.

By this Rokeach meant that dogmatic (or closed-minded) people rarely

attempt to integrate intrinsically related beliefs about a topic into a single overall
impression.

Rather, dogmatic people tend to maintain closely related and often

contradictory beliefs in isolation of each other. Less dogmatic people, on the other
hand, tend to integrate their beliefs.
Based on this definition, highly dogmatic people should be more likely to agree
with a message that runs counter to their past beliefs because they will not attempt to
integrate their past beliefs with the message they are hearing. Less dogmatic people,
on the other hand, should be less likely to agree with a counter-attitudinal message
because they will try to integrate past beliefs with a discrepant message. Although it
may seem counter-intuitive to hypothesize that dogmatism and unbounded
persuasibility should be positively related, two studies support this contention.
Cronkhite and Goetz ( 1971) reported that dogmatism correlated .40 with
persuasibility, and Jenks (1965) reported a smaller (but still significant) correlation of
.20 between these two variables.

Gender. Results from gender studies are not as clear cut. Based on bounded
persuasion studies that exposed men and women to a single message (for a review see
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Eagly & Carli, 1981), some researchers have hypothesized that women might be more
persuasible when exposed to a variety of messages. However, the research evidence
is somewhat inconclusive for two reasons.
contradictory.

Foremost, the findings are often

Although several studies have found that females were more

persuasible than males {Epting, 1967; Glass et al. 1969; Janis & Field, 1959b; Jones,
1976; King, 1959; Silverman et al. 1970, Study 3; Whittaker, 1965), other studies
found either no differences between men and women (Abelson & Lesser, 1959;
Cacioppo &

~etty,

1980; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1984; Silverman et al., 1970; Study

1; Whittaker & Meade, 1967) or found that men were actually more, not less,
persuasible than women (Silverman et al., 1970, Study 2). Second, Eagly and Carli
(1981) have argued convincingly that men may only appear less persuasible because
men have been more interested and more invested in the particular messages that
researchers have used in the past. Additional research is needed to see if men and
women differ in unbounded persuasibility after differences in interest in the messages
are factored out.

Social Desirability (Approval Motivation). Silverman et al. (1970) predicted
that people who are more motivated to attain social approval would be more
persuasible than people who are less motivated by social approval. The results from
three studies (Silverman et al., 1970, studies 1, 2, and 3), however, do not support
this hypothesis.

Two of those studies (Study 1 and Study 3) found that social

desirability was not related to unbounded persuasibility, and another study (Study 2)
found that social desirability was negatively related to unbounded persuasibility, not
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positively as predicted. This last finding suggests that resisting persuasion may be
more socially desirable than agreeing with a message.
Self-F.steem. As with gender, past research on self-esteem and unbounded

persuasibility is inconclusive. Janis (1954) first suggested that people who think
highly of themselves might also think highly of their attitudes. Accordingly, people
of high self-esteem might be very resistant to most persuasive messages, whereas
people of low esteem might be more open to persuasive messages. Although most
studies have predicted and found that self-esteem is negatively correlated with
unbounded persuasibility (Janis, 1954, 1955; Janis & Field, 1959, Silverman et al.,
1970, Study 2), other studies have found no linear relationship between self-esteem
and unbounded persuasibility (Glass et al., 1969; Silverman et al., 1970, Study 1).
This inconsistency of findings could exist because self-esteem might share a
curvilinear relationship with unbounded persuasibility.

Supporting this notion,

Silverman et al. (1970, Study 3) did report.that participants with low and high selfesteem were less persuasible than participants with moderate self-esteem.

A

curvilinear relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility is consistent
with McGuire's ( 1969, 1985) information processing model of personality and
persuasibility. McGuire pointed out that persuasion is the result of two-stage process.
Before being persuaded, a message recipient must (a) pay enough attention to a
message to comprehend its meaning, and (b) accept or yield to the message's
_conclusions. He also noted that a curvilinear relationship would occur between a
personality variable and unbounded persuasibility if the personality variable related
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positively to attention, but related negatively to acceptance, or vice versa.
To clarify McGuire's (1969, 1985) model, Figure 2 displays the theoretical
relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility.

According to

McGuire's theory, as self-esteem moves from low to high levels, message recipients
are more likely to attend to a variety of messages, thereby increasing their opportunity
to be persuaded. However, as esteem moves from low to high levels, recipients are
less likely to accept messages, and are therefore less likely to be persuaded. In effect,
as self-esteem grows people compensate for their increased attention by decreasing
their acceptance of messages. The result of these two competing processes is an
inverted U-shaped or quadratic relationship between self-esteem and unbounded
persuasibility where the greatest amount of persuasibility should occur at moderate
levels of self-esteem.
Anxiety ..Curvilinearity might also explain the relationship between unbounded
persuasibility and anxiety. Reasoning that anxiety would interfere with attention to
a message, Janis (1954) originally hypothesized that anxiety should correlate
n~gatively

with persuasibility. Supporting this notion, he found that participants who

were more neurotically anxious were less persuasible than participants who were not
neurotically anxious (Janis, 1954; 1955). However, he also found that measures of
test anxiety showed a marginally positive correlation with persuasibility (Janis &
Field, 1959).
The negative correlations in one study and positive correlations in another study
might suggest a curvilinear relationship across studies. Using McGuire's framework,
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16
one could predict that a small amount of anxiety might promote acceptance (thereby
increasing persuasibility), but large amount of anxiety might interfere with attention
(thereby decreasing persuasibility). People with moderate levels of anxiety might be
the most persuasible because they are both attentive and motivated to accept a
message.

Other Personality Variables.

Two other personality variables might be

related to persuasibility. The first is need-for-cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
Persons who have a strong need-for-cognition enjoy cognitive activity and may be
more likely to enjoy the intellectual stimulation that comes from pondering counterattitudinal editorials. Persons who have a weak need-for-cognition are cognitivemisers who may try to avoid any serious consideration of a counter-attitudinal
message.

Using McGuire's (1968; 1985) theory, we can expect a curvilinear

relationship between unbounded persuasibility and need-for-cognition. As need-forcognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients ought to be more willing
to ponder counter-attitudinal editorials, and therefore be more generally persuasible.
However, as need-for-cognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients
might consider arguments against each editorial, and therefore be less persuasible.
The end result is that people who are at moderate levels of need-for-cognition should
be. the most persuasible.

To date no study has investigated either the linear or

curvilinear relationship between need-for-cognition and unbounded persuasibility
across a variety of messages.
Another personality variable that might be related to unbounded persuasibility
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is ambiguity intolerance. Phillips (1981) suggested that some people have trouble
tolerating inconsistencies among their beliefs that come from complicated and
ambiguous issues. According to Phillips, people who can tolerate ambiguities will not
feel compelled to change their attitudes when faced with counter-attitudinal messages.
On the other hand, people who cannot tolerate ambiguities will be compelled to
change their attitudes. Unfortunately, Phillips did not test this hypothesis directly,
and no other studies have addressed the relationship between unbounded persuasibility
and ambiguit)". intolerance.
Summary. Given the inconsistencies in research findings and the possibility
of non-linear relationships, more research is needed before psychologists can draw any
straightforward conclusions about how personality variables relate to unbounded
persuasibility.

Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Unbounded Persuasibility
The last, and least explored angle to studying unbounded persuasibility has been
through the use of self-report measures of persuasibility.

In order to study

persuasibility, most previous researchers adopted the laborious strategy of measuring
participants' attitudes toward several topics both before and after reading counterattitudinal messages on those topics (see Line B, Figure 1). This strategy allowed
researchers to define, post hoc, each participant's degree of unbounded persuasibility
by summing across the amount of persuasion produced by each message.
The main advantage of this pretest-posttest strategy is that unbounded
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persuasibility scores can serve as a criterion that researchers can try to predict using
other variables (e.g., self-esteem). Two disadvantages of this strategy, however,
make unbounded persuasibility a very difficult area to study.

First, because

participants must be exposed to pretests, posttests, and messages on several topics, this
strategy is cumbersome and impractical for most research settings.

Second, the

pretest-posttest strategy only provides a post hoc method of defining persuasibility
after exposing participants to several messages. The pretest-posttest strategy was
never intended to produce a priori predictions of how susceptible a person is to a
variety of messages.

In effect, the pretest-posttest strategy allows researchers to

define the criterion of persuasibility, but does not provide researchers with an
independent, a priori measure of unbounded persuasibility.

Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ). To facilitate more
research on persuasibility, researchers have tried to replace the inefficient pretestposttest strategy with relatively short paper-and-pencil rating scales that could measure
unbounded persuasibility efficiently and successfully.

(See Line D, Figure 1.)

Toward this goal, Janis and Field (1959) devised an 11-item paper-and-pencil scale
that asked subjects for self-ratings of susceptibility to influence by mass
communication and friends. However, when attempting to validate the Janis-Field
Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ), Janis and Field found that scores on their paperand-pencil scale could not predict a, criterion score of unbounded persuasibility, and
. therefore could not be used as a measure of persuasibility.
In retrospect, the JFPQ may have failed for two reasons. First, the JFPQ was
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based on only 11 items. Perhaps, a test with more items would have been more
predictive. Second, Janis and Field (1959) did not subject these items to any form of
item analysis. Instead, they simply combined all 11 items into a single score without
first eliminating items that weakened either the internal consistency or predictive
validity of the total score. An item analysis strategy might have produced a short
self-rating scale that was both a reliable and valid measure of persuasibility.
Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPn. The next and most recent attempt to
develop a paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility was made by Phillips
(1981) who relied on three hypotheses to guide his development of a persuasibility
scale. Phillips reasoned that highly persuasible people are probably highly dogmatic,
generally intolerant of ambiguity in their beliefs, and more likely to conform to social
pressure.
systems,

Following Rokeach's (1960) notion of dogmatism and closed beliefPhillip~

reasoned that highly dogmatic people less often try to integrate

persuasive messages with existing beliefs. As a result, highly dogmatic people ought
to be less likely to argue against, and more likely to accept a wide range of persuasive
~essages

than should less dogmatic people.

Adopting Norton's (1976) notion of

ambiguity intolerance, Phillips then suggested that some people have trouble
integrating inconsistent beliefs into an existing attitude structure without changing their
attitudes. As a result, people who are intolerant of ambiguity are more likely to
change their attitudes when exposed to counter-attitudinal messages than are people
who are tolerant of ambiguity. Finally, Phillips reasoned that highly persuasible
people probably rely on other people to define their own attitudes, rather than relying
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on their own beliefs or experiences. Such other-directed people, therefore, ought to
~mply

more readily with persuasive messages.

Based on these hypotheses, Phillips devised a paper-and-pencil scale of
unbounded persuasibility that included the twenty item Short-Form Dogmatism Scale
(Trodahl & Powell, 1965), nine items from the Measure of Ambiguity Intolerance
(MAT-50, Norton, 1975), seven items from the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI,
Shostrom, 1964) as a measure of social compliance, and six bogus items to evaluate
potential response biases. To test the validity of the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory
(PPI), Phillips ( 1981) administered his inventory to participants just before they were
placed in group discussions. As a group, participants then discussed four risk-taking
situations, and came to a consensus about how to best solve the issues raised in each
situation. Participants had to decide whether a fictitious person should take a new
job, whether another fictitious person should take a gamble in a game, whether a
young couple should risk marriage, and whether a company should build a factory in
a foreign country. Results revealed that those participants who changed more of their
opinions scored significantly higher on the PPI, suggesting that the PPI may be a valid
paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility.
There are, however, strong reasons to question the validity of the PPI as a
measure of unbounded persuasibility. One reason centers on how Phillips (1981)
developed his measure of persuasibility (the PPI).

By including the Personal

Orientation Inventory (POI) into the PPI, Phillips (1981) intentionally included a
conformity scale as a central component of his persuasibility scale. However, when
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defining unbounded persuasibility, Hovland and Janis (1959), and later McGuire
( 1968) were careful to distinguish between conformity from persuasibility. According
to these and other theorists (Kelman, 1958), conformity involves publicly stated
agreement with a message, whereas persuasibility involves privately felt agreement.
People may publicly conform to the ideas being presented by other people without
privately agreeing with those ideas. Given this important distinction, Phillips should
have factored conformity out of the PPI, rather than include it as a central component.
By including the POI, the Phillips measure of persuasibility blurs the distinction
between persuasibility and conformity.
Another related criticism is that Phillips' criterion of persuasibility also blurs
the distinction between persuasibility and conformity. In order to get a criterion
measure of persuasibility, participants in Phillips' study were put into small groups
and told that each group had to come to a common consensus on several issues.
Before debating each issue, participants privately stated their own opinions. Group
members then publicly debated each issue until all members agreed upon one common
position.

Using this strategy, Phillips defined his criterion of unbounded

persuasibility by how often participants abandoned their private opinions and publicly
conceded to a consensus opinion. This strategy, however, may have produced a
criterion measure of generalized conformity rather than a criterion of unbounded
persuasibility.
Because both his paper-and-pencil measure and his criterion of unbounded
persuasibility included components of conformity, these two criticisms suggest that
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Phillips might have developed a valid measure of conformity, rather than a valid
measure of persuasibility. In line with this argument, Pietscher (1984) found that
scores on the PPI were unrelated to criterion scores of unbounded persuasibility when
persuasibility was defined using a more traditional persuasion design. Rather than
putting participants into small groups and requiring them publicly to come to a
common opinion on several issues, Pietscher had participants complete the PPI and
then read persuasive messages on three topics (the military draft, the Equal Rights
Amendment, and capital punishment). To get a criterion score of persuasibility, she
then allowed participants to state privately their agreement with the messages. Using
this more traditional persuasion design, Pietscher found, as expected, no relationship
between unbounded persuasibility and PPI scores, suggesting that the PPI is not a pure
measure of persuasibility.

C. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IN PERSUASIBILITY RESEARCH
The issues raised in the above discussion suggest three unresolved questions in
persuasibility research. The first concerns the strength of unbounded persuasibility
as a personality disposition, and asks how strongly the amount of persuasion produced
by one message relates to the amount of persuasion produced by other messages.
Although some studies suggest that a person who is persuaded by a message on one
topic is moderately more likely to be persuaded by messages on other topics, research
on this question is rare.

For this reason, another study on the strength of

persuasibility can increase substantially our knowledge of unbounded persuasibility.
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A second question asks how strongly various personality variables relate to
unbounded persuasibility. Given the largely inconsistent findings in this area, no
straightforward conclusions can be drawn about any particular personality variable.
Furthermore, given the possibility of non-linear relationships between personality
variables and unbounded persuasibility, additional research that tests specifically for
non-linear relationships is needed.
The third unresolved question is whether a valid paper-and-pencil measure of
unbounded persuasibility can be devised. At this point there is no measure that can
predict a priori who will most likely and who will least likely change their attitudes
across a variety of topics. Such a measure would have both important theoretical and
practical uses. For instance, such a measure would be helpful in testing theories that
predict individual differences in attitude change. It could also be helpful, among other
possible applications, in determining who might benefit most from cognitively based
therapy programs that rely in large part on persuasion and attitude change.

D. GOALS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The current study was conducted with the above three issues in mind. The first
goal was to assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality
disposition. This was assessed by computing the average correlation between the
levels of persuasion produced by four different messages.
The second goal was to see how several personality variables relate to
unbounded persuasibility. The answers to the following questions were sought.
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1. Does gender relate to unbounded persuasibility? Specifically,
are women more open to a variety of persuasive messages than
men (cf. Eagly & Carli, 1981)? Moreover, if there are gender
differences, can these differences be attributed to male-female
differences in interest in the topic of the message?
2. How does dogmatism relate to unbounded persuasibility? As
others (Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Jenks, 1965; Phillips, 1981)
have predicted, is there a positive relationship such that highly
dogmatic people are more susceptible to a wide range of
persuasive messages than less dogmatic people?
3. How does social desirability relate to persuasibility? Common
sense would suggest that people who are highly motivated to
attain social approval should be more likely to adopt the
attitudes of other people. However, past findings suggest the
opposite is true and that people who are motivated to attain
approval generally resist persuasion.
·
4. How does self-esteem relate to persuasibility? Are people low
self-esteem more open to general persuasion than people with
high self-esteem? Or, is there a curvilinear relationship between
esteem and persuasibility?
5. How does anxiety relate to persuasibility? Is the relationship
negative as Janis (1954, 1955) predicted, or curvilinear as
McGuire's theory (1968, 1985) would predict?
6. How do individual differences in need-for-cognition relate to
persuasibility? If there is a relationship between need-forcognition and persuasibility, is the relationship curvilinear as
would be predicted by McGuire's theory (1968, 1985)?
7. How does ambiguity intolerance relate to persuasibility? Are
people who less tolerant of ambiguity more likely to agree with
a range of counter-attitudinal messages (cf. Phillips, 1981)?
The third goal of this study was to develop and evaluate psychometrically a
new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. Toward this last goal, the
current study sought the following:
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1. To derive a new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded
persuasibility. This new scale was lli2.t based on a series of
personality ~ that were initially designed to measure other
personality traits. Instead, a new scale was derived from a large
pool of items that were specifically written to measure
persuasibility. Stated differently, this study did not follow the
multiple-construct approach used by Phillips (1981), but instead,
attempted to build a more homogeneous, more straightforward,
and more direct measure of persuasibility. {This test is hereafter
referred to as the P-Scale.)
2. To compare the predictive validity of three paper-and-pencil
measures of persuasibility tests. Scores on the JFPQ, PPI, and
the newer P-Scale test were correlated against a criterion of
persuasibility in order to learn which of these measures was
most predictive of attitude change across topics.

IT.METHOD

A. PILOT RESEARCH.
Before these goals could be met, four pilot studies were conducted. The first
of these studies identified four attitude issues on which undergraduates were
ambivalent and could be persuaded to change their attitudes. These issues involved
the practice of euthanasia, the traditions regarding marriage for Catholic priests, the
use of selective admissions policies at publicly funded universities, and the imposition
of mandatory drug testing for employees of private companies. The second pilot
study identified the salient and cogent beliefs that served as the foundation of attitudes
toward these four issues.

The third pilot study helped create attitude scales and

editorials that could effectively persuade undergraduates to adopt new attitudes toward
euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug testing. Finally,
the fourth pilot study assessed the internal consistency of the P-Scale and its initial
pool of items that were written as a paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. (See
Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the exact goals, procedures and findings from
these studies.)
Having produced reliable attitude measures, persuasive "pro" and "con"
editorials on four issues, and an internally consistent pool of paper-and-pencil items
for a persuasibility measure, all of the necessary stimulus materials were assembled
to test hypotheses regarding the degree, the correlates, and the measurement of
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persuasibility.

B. THE FINAL STUDY
Subjects
Three-hundred and twenty-seven students from Loyola University of Chicago
were recruited for a study on how people's personalities relate to their attitudes.
Students in five introductory psychology courses and two statistics courses were given
credit toward their course grades for participating in two experimental sessions that
were separated by at least one week. Participants were predominantly female (68 %)
and averaged 18. 7 years of age (S = 1. 80). Because 13 (or 4 %) of participants who
attended the first experimental session failed to attend the second session, the
following analyses were conducted using data from 314 participants who attended both
sessions.

Materials

Attitude Scales. Participants were asked to complete scales that assessed their
attitudes toward four issues: euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, and
drug testing. Two different response formats were used to assess each attitude. First,
participants used a seven-point Likert-style format to indicate how strongly they
agreed with or disagreed with various statements about a particular issue.

For

instance, participants used a scale that ranged from 1 (disagree very strongly) to 7
(agree very strongly) to indicate whether they thought "there are good reasons to

28

support euthanasia." Second, participants used a 7-point semantic-differential format
to describe their feelings about each issue. For example, respondents used a 7-point
scale to indicate whether euthanasia was closer to being "good" or closer to being
"bad," in their personal opinion.

Ten Likert-style statements and 14 semantic-

differential pairs were used to assess attitudes toward each of the four issues.
Furthermore, participants were asked how much they had heard ( 1 =none,
4 =very much) previously about euthanasia, married priests, university admissions
policies, and _drug testing, and how important each issue was to them (l=very
unimportant, 5 =very important). (See Appendix B for copies of all attitude scales.)
Counter-attitudinal Editorials. Each participant was asked to read, in all, a
set of four editorials dealing with euthanasia, married priests, university admissions,
and drug testing. Because each of these editorials had to run counter to a participant's
attitudes, eight different editorials were used in this study. For each of the four
issues, both "pro" and "con" editorials were used. In all, there was one editorial that
supported the use of euthanasia, and one that opposed euthanasia; one that supported,
and one that opposed marriage for priests; one that supported, and one that opposed
open admissions to universities; and, one that supported, and one that opposed
mandatory drug testing. Each editorial was written specifically for this study, and
ranged between 630 and 740 words. Pilot research found that each editorial was
effective in changing the opinions of its readers. (See Appendix C for copies of the
eight editorials.)
Personality Scales.

Participants were also asked to complete several
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personality scales that measured dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety,
ambiguity intolerance, and need-for-cognition. Specifically, participants completed
the Marlowe-Crowne Social-Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967), the
Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait Anxiety Inventory {Speilberger
et al., 1983), and the Need-For-Cognition Scale4 (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). (See
Appendix D for copies of these personality scales.)
Participants also completed the Phillips (1981) Persuasibility Inventory (PPI).
(See Appendix E.) This last inventory was built with subscales that allowed us to
measure dogmatism and ambiguity intolerance. The first subscale consisted of 20
items (numbers 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41,
and 42) from a short-form of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Trodahl & Powell,
1965). The second subscale consisted of nine items (6, 10, 15, 19, 22, 25, 30, 34,
and 39) from the Ambiguity Intolerance Scale (Norton, 1975).
Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility.

Finally, three paper-and-

pencil measures of persuasibility were used in this study. These self-rating scales
included the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field
Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and a newly devised persuasibility scale
(P-Scale). It should be kept in mind that the PPI itself was used as a measure of
persuasibility, and its subscales were used as measures of personality variables. (See
Appendix E for copies of each persuasibility scale.)
The newly devised P-Scale contained initially 62 items that were written
specifically to measure persuasibility. Various personality traits and attitude change
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processes served as a basis for devising these items. The items were written to reflect
the working assumptions that highly persuasible people are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

more certainty-oriented than uncertainty-oriented;
less confident of themselves and their attitudes;
more likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people;
more able to see issues from different perspective;
5. less reactive in the protection of current attitudes; and
6. less apt to see attitude change as a negative event.
Two personality traits -- certainty orientation and self-esteem -- were included
in these assumptions, and served as a foundation for some of the initial items. First,
certainty orientation (Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) represents a person's motivation
to process carefully any messages that might complicate or contradict established
attitudes. Uncertainty-oriented people are motivated to process messages thoroughly, and tend to be very critical in their acceptance of a message. Certainty-oriented
people, however, simply want to be given the "correct" attitude, and try to avoid
careful processing of messages, tending to accept messages uncritically. Thus, several
items were written that addressed how carefully participants process messages, and
how often they accept messages uncritically. Second, self-confidence and self-esteem
were used as a basis for some questions. Because some past research on persuasibility
suggests that people who suffer from low self-esteem are more open to persuasion,
several items were included that addressed how confidently participants hold their
opinions and how often they believe their opinions are correct.
Along with these two personality traits, three attitude change processes were
included in the working definition of a highly persuasible person. First, the notion
of social comparison (Allen & Wilder, 1977) was used. We reasoned that highly
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persuasible people more often compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people.
Second, the notion of a perceptual shift or a qualitative change in how a person views
an attitude issue was used. Based on the theorizing of Upshaw and Ostrom (1984) we
reasoned that people who more frequently report being able to see an issue from a
"new point of view" would be more likely to change their opinions than those who
rarely shift their perspective. Finally, the notion of psychological reactance (Brehm
& Brehm, 1981) served as a basis for some items. It was assumed that people who
are not highly protective of their attitudes will be easier to persuade. Based on these
three attitude change processes, several items were written that addressed how often
participants compare their attitudes to the attitudes of others, how easily they can see
an issue from another point of view, and how protective they are of their own
attitudes.
In addition, several questions were written to assess participants' feelings about
attitude change. It was assumed .that participants who thought attitude change was a
negative event and indicative of personal weakness would be resistant to messages,
and that participants who thought attitude change was a positive event and indicative
of self-improvement would be more open to persuasive messages.

Procedures
Session I. Participants were given a packet of questionnaires to complete when
they arrived for the first experimental session.

In the beginning of the packet,

participants were asked to describe some recent occasions during which another person
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tried to influence their opinions. This was done under the assumption that participants
could more accurately complete persuasibility measures if they first spent some time
remembering their reactions to recent attitude change situations.
After describing these situations, participants were instructed to work their way
through the rest of the packet which began with the P-Scale, followed with the PPI,
the JFPQ, and the MCSD scale, and ended with the scales that assessed participants'
attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug
testing. After completing these scales, participants made arrangements to attend a
second experimental session. Most participants (58.4 %) returned within 10 to 14 days
after their first session (average number of days between sessions= 10.9, S =5.0), and
none were allowed to return before at least three days had passed.
Interim Period.

Before attending a second session, a series of counter-

attitudinal editorials were selected individually for each participant. To determine
which editorials to select, the four attitude scales were scored by research assistants.
After (a) averaging together responses to individual Likert-style and semanticdifferential scales, and (b) determining whether the average scores were greater than
or less than the midway point of 4.0 on the scales that ranged from 1 to 7, research
assistants determined which attitude positions a participant favored (i.e., those with
average scores greater than 4.0) and which positions a participant opposed (i.e., those
with average scores less than 4.0).

Based on these determinations, four counter-

attitudinal editorials were then selected for individual participants. In those rare cases
where the average score on the attitude items was exactly 4.0, research assistants
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selected editorials based on the flip of a coin.
Session II. During the second session, participants were given another packet

of materials. This second packet contained the four counter-attitudinal editorials, each
followed by its corresponding attitude scale.

This packet also contained three

personality scales, including the Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait
Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983),

~d

the Need-For-Cognition Scale

(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). After completing the post-editorial attitude scales, and
filling out the personality scales, participants were debriefed.

(The ordering of

materials and potential order-effects are discussed further in Endnote 5.)
The most important feature of this method was that four bounded persuasion
scores (one produced by each counter-attitudinal editorial) could be computed for each
participant. These scores, in tum, allowed us (a) to assess the strength of unbounded
persuasibility as a personality trait by analyzing the relationships among the four
bounded persuasion scores, (b) to test hypot.heses regarding the relationships among
personality variables and unbounded persuasibility scores, defined by summing across
the four bounded persuasion scores, and (c) to evaluate the validity a three paperand-pencil measures of persuasibility. Results will be discussed in light of these three
goals.

ID. RESULTS

A. STRENGTH OF UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY

If unbounded persuasibility is a personality trait that plays a dominant role in
determining someone's acceptance or rejection of a message, then there should be a
positive correlation between the amount of persu~sion produced by a message on one
issue and the amount of persuasion produced by different messages on different issues.
That is, people who are unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about
euthanasia should also be unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about
married priests, university admissions, or drug testing.

If, on the other hand,

persuasibility plays an unimportant role in the acceptance or rejection of a message,
there should be a non-significant correlation between the amount of persuasion
produced by different messages.
Before the strength of unbounded per.suasibility could be assessed, the amount
of persuasion produced by each editorial (i.e., bounded persuasion scores) had to be
computed for each participant. This was done in two stages. First, item change
scores were computed for each of the Likert-style and semantic-differential items that
measured attitudes toward each of the four issues (euthanasia, married priests,
university admissions, and drug testing).

Item change scores were based on the

difference between pre-editorial (Session I) and post-editorial (Session II) responses
- on each item. It is important to note that not all change between pre- and post-
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editorial responses indicated persuasion, and that some change in responses actually
indicated reactance, the very opposite of persuasion. If a response changed reactively
in the direction opposed by an editorial, then the item change score (i.e, Session I Session II) obtained a negative value. If, however, a response was coaxed in the
direction advocated by an editorial, then the item change score obtained a positive
value.
After change scores were computed for each item, bounded persuasion scores
were computed separately for each of the four editorial topics by averaging together
the 24 item change scores that were derived from the Likert and semantic differential
items. 6 The bounded persuasion scores produced by the editorials on euthanasia,
married priests, university admission policies, and drug testing all reached acceptable
levels of internal consistency (Standardized Alphas = . 89, . 93, .91, and .93,
respectively).

A~

can be seen by the high number of positive bounded persuasion

scores in Table 1, most participants were persuaded by the different editorials.
Depending on the topic, between 72 and 75 percent of the participants changed their
at~itudes

in the directions advocated by the editorials they read.

However, a

substantial minority (between 28 and 25 percent) of participants did change their
attitudes in the direction opposed by an editorial.
After the four bounded persuasion scores were computed, it was possible to
assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility by inter-correlating the four bounded
persuasion scores.

As can be seen in Table 2, all of the correlations between

persuasion scores were significantly greater than zero. The average correlation among
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Table 1
Frequencies and Qescriptiye Statistics for Bounded Persuasion and
Unbounded Persuasibility scores
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Both bounded and unbounded scores had a potential range of 14
points.

2

Bounded persuasion scores represent the average of 24 item change
scores. Positive (Negative) scores represent a change in attitudes in
the direction advocated (opposed) by an editorial. For exomple, a
persuasion score of +2.0 (-2.0) indicated a participant changed
his/her responses by two points in the direction advocated (opposed)
by an editorial.
3

Unbounded persuasibility scores were computed for each participant
by averaging together the four bounded persuasion scores. Higher
unbounded persuasibility scores represent greater agreement across the
four editorials.
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Table 2
Correlations Among Bounded Persuasion Scores.

>~~than~~···
Pers\lasic>n.·• >·.
scbres<> >/ . . ·. · ·
Married Priests

··•i>ersua5ion·>···•·•·•·••. .·.·•· · ·

<········
ufil~~ A.dffiiss.>

·~ores

.

. :Pel's:Uasidh

scores

~:

<·••· .... •·•

<·······.·

5

.uP~~§~~t;~·. g=<

phig 'festing

Married· Priests·
Persuasion Scores

.··<· .. ersuasion .... e<>~~>··

}>ersuasfon Scores

.1699
(285)

.1469
(277)

.1401
(281)

<.001

<.005

<.005

.1840
(276)

.3318
(279)

<.001

<.001
.2484
(273)

<.001

Correlations are in bold-faced type, one-tailed probabilities are in light-faced type
and N's are in parentheses.
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among the four bounded persuasion scores (using Fisher's transformations) was .21
(Qf=271, one-tailed 12< .025), indicating that the level of persuasion produced by one
editorial was positively associated with the level of persuasion produced by different
editorials on different topics.
However, the modest size of this correlation also indicates that unbounded
persuasibility was not a dominant factor in persuasion. Levels of persuasion produced
by one editorial were not closely related to the levels of persuasion produced by other
editorials.

Furthermore, the average correlation increased to only .22 after we

adjusted the correlations among bounded persuasion scores for the lack of reliability
inherent in each of the four persuasion scores. As a result, an average of only 4.8%
of variance in one persuasion score could be predicted from variance in the remaining
persuasion scores. 7

B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY
Next we investigated the linear and non-linear (quadratic) relationships between
persuasibility and several individual difference variables. Before investigating these
relationships, unbounded persuasibility scores were computed by averaging together
the four bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 1 for the distribution of unbounded
persuasibility scores.) As could be expected of any scale that was based on only four
items that are modestly related, the resulting unbounded persuasibility scores had only
modest internal consistency (Standardized Alpha= .50).
The first set of analyses tested the hypothesis that women are, on the average,
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more persuasible than men. There was only qualified support for this hypothesis.
Independent samples t-tests on unbounded persuasibility scores revealed that women
were only marginally more persuasible across topics than men. (See Table 3 for
results of this analysis.) Subsequent analyses of bounded persuasion scores revealed
that women were only more persuaded than men after reading editorials about
mandatory drug testing. Women, however, were not more persuaded than men by
editorials dealing with euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, and university
admission policies. (See Table 3 for results of these analyses.)
To see if gender differences in the acceptance of drug testing messages could
be attributed to gender difference in interest in that issue, an analysis of covariance
(ANCOV A) was performed on bounded persuasion scores using gender as a grouping
variable and participants' interest in drug testing as a covariate.

"Interest" was

defined as how important drug testing was to each participant (1 =very unimportant,

5 =very important).

Using "interest," however, did not appreciably change the

difference between men and women in response to messages on drug testing. Women
remained marginally more open to messages on drug testing than did men
[.E(l,279)=3.168, 12=.075].
The second set of analyses assessed the linear relationship between unbounded
persuasibility scores and scores on the various personality scales (i.e., dogmatism,
social desirability,

self-esteem,

anxiety,

need-for-cognition,

and ambiguity

. intolerance). Analyses revealed that unbounded persuasibility scores were not linearly
related to either higher levels of dogmatism, stronger motivation for social approval,
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Table 3
Mean Unbounded Persuasibility Scores and Bounded Persuasion Scores b_y Gender

.5475
(193)
... . .

.

..

WOMEN•·········L
.4510
( 93)

-0.08

(196)

Married Priests
Persuasion

.4633
(193)

.4219
( 93)

0.37

University Admissions
Persuasion

.6065
(190)

.5132
( 89)

0.78

Drug Testing Persuasion

.6642
(189)

.4356
( 93)

1.84*

Euthanasia Persuasion

~:

.4434

Means are in bold-faced type and N's are in parentheses. • J2 < .05, one-tailed.
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higher anxiety, higher needs for cognition, or lower self-esteem. (See Table 4 for
correlations between generalized persuasibility scores and each personality scale. For
completeness, both the inter-correlations among the various personality scales and
descriptive statistics for each scale are also provided in Table 4.) Only ambiguity
intolerance showed a significant, albeit modest, relationship with unbounded
persuasibility. As expected, participants who were less tolerant of ambiguity in their
lives were generally more persuaded by a variety of messages.
Given that only ambiguity intolerance showed a linear relationship with
unbounded persuasibility scores, linear relationships between the various personality
scales and the four bounded persuasion scores were examined.

That is, each

personality scale was correlated with the amount of persuasion produced on each issue
separately, rather than on all issues simultaneously.

As can be seen in Table 5,

dogmatism, social desirability, anxiety, and need-for-cognition could not be used
accurately to predict any of the bounded persuasion scores.

Only ambiguity

intolerance and self-esteem were, at best, modestly related to any of the bounded
persuasion scores.
As an exploratory follow-up, we used polynomial regression techniques to test
for non-linear (quadratic) relationships between personality variables and unbounded
persuasibility scores. In all of these analyses, we used non-linear equations to predict
unbounded persuasibility scores from scores on the personality scales. Analyses were
done separately for each personality scale, and each analysis was done hierarchically
by entering second-order polynomials to test for quadratic relationships after entering
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Correlations Amon& Unbounded Persuasibility Scores and Personality Scales
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Table 5
Correlations Amon2 Bounded Persuasion Scores and Personality Sca1es

\ Ptrs1lasion ···
.. · Score

Need~For

Cognition
~:

. ·•..• <.Married
Pri~sts

·.

Persuasion
· Score

· ·<p.·• .·•·•·~.·• · . &~ ~!~· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·,.i;:~g

··

•.

!:5£1oasr.ei.o
.• ·. ·.·•1i
.• ·.•.·•·•••.<
.
.x;

•

········.Persuasion
< Score

.025
(284)
<.50

.032
(277)
<.50

-.047
(280)
<.25

.027
(282)
<.50

-.040
(279)
<.25

-.043
(272)
<.25

-.043
(275)
<.25

-.049
(285)
<.25

.031
(284)
<.50

-.106
(278)
<.05

.064
(282)
<.15

.026
(288)
<.50

-.016
(285)
<.50

.068
(279)
<.15

-.078
(283)
.10

.032
(288)
<.50

.089
(284)
<.10

.172
(277)
<.005

.062
(280)
<.15

.042
(283)
<.25

-.028
(280)
<.50

-.018
(274)
<.50

.095
(278)
<.10

Correlations are in bold-faced type, probability levels are in light-faced type,
and N's are in parentheses.

44
first-order polynomials. As can be seen Table 6, there were no significant quadratic
relationships between generalized persuasibility and any of the personality scales.
There was, however, a marginally significant curvilinear relationship between social
desirability and unbounded persuasibility such that people with moderate MCSD
scores were more open to persuasion than people with either high or low MCSD
scores.

C. VALIDITY OF PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY
The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of three paperand-pencil scales that were designed as measures of unbounded persuasibility.
Specifically, the goal was to see how accurately the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory
(PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and the
newly devised P-scale could predict unbounded persuasibility scores.

However,

before reporting on these last results, the procedures used to select items from the Pscale will be described.

Item Selection for the P-Scale
Rather than measure persuasibility with the entire pool of 62 items (see
Appendix D for copies of these items), an attempt was made to reduce the number of
individual items into a more manageable set of common factors. For this reason, a
_ factor analytic approach was used to select and reject items from the initial item pool.
The factor analysis was done in eight stages.
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Table 6
Summary of Findings from Quadratic Regressions of Unbounded Persuasibility Scores
on Personality Scales
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In the first stage, the total sample of 314 participants was divided randomly
into two sub-samples: an initial or exploratory sample (n= 157), and a hold-out or
validation sample (n = 157).

Dividing the total sample into sub-samples made it

possible to cross-validate the findings in the eighth and final stage of the item
analysis.
In the second stage, a principal components analysis was performed on the first
sample to estimate the number of factors within the initial item pool. The number of
factors was initially estimated by the number of components that (a) had eigenvalues
greater than 1. 00, (b) explained at least 5 % of the total variance in the correlation
matrix, and (c) contained at least three items with loadings of absolute value greater
than .40. As seen in Table 7, only three components met these criteria in the first
sample.

Moreover, an inspection of the scree plot (see Figure 3) from the first

sample gave further support to a three-factor solution.
The third stage in selecting items was to rotate the components. To determine
if the three components were oblique or orthogonal, a principal component analysis
with oblique (oblimin) rotation was performed on the first sample. The resulting
correlations among components revealed that the three components were, in fact,
orthogonal. Scores on the first component correlated only .025 and .079 with scores
on the second and third components, respectively, and scores on the second
component showed virtually no correlation {r=-.006) with scores on the third
component (all 12's=n.s.).
Having determined that the 62 items in the initial item pool could be reduced
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Table 7
Eis;envalues and Percent of Variance Explained b_y a Principal Component
Analysis of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N = 156)
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Figure 3: Scree Plot from a Principal Component Analysis
of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N = 157)
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to three orthogonal components, the fourth step was to reject the items that did not
load strongly on .any component. To accomplish this, a factor analysis (as opposed
to a principal component analysis) was performed, using a three-factor solution with
an orthogonal (varimax) rotation. The size of the orthogonally rotated loadings for
each item were then inspected. A decision was made to reject those items that did not
have loadings with absolute values greater than .40 on any of the three factors, and
to retain for further analyses those items that did have loadings with absolute values
greater than .40. Using this criterion, 13 items (numbers 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23,
25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) were retained for the first factor, and 11 items (numbers
1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 32, 49, and 52) were retained for the second factor. The
third factor was dropped entirely because only two items (numbers 40 and 42) had
loadings with absolute values greater than .40 in the first sample. This procedure
reduced the initial item pool from 62 to 24 items.
The fifth step was to repeat the

ab~ve

procedures (again, for just the first

sample) using only the 24 items that were retained from the initial pool. To reestimate the number of factors among the 24 items, another principal components
analysis (rather than a factor analysis) was conducted. Results revealed that the first
two components accounted for 19.4% and 16.0% of the total variance in the reduced
correlation matrix, respectively, and that no other component accounted for more than
6% of the total variance, or had more than two items with loadings of absolute value
. greater than .40 (see Table 8).
After determining that the reduced pool of 24 items contained two components,
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Table 8
Eiienyalues and Percent of Variance Explained by a Principal Component Analysis of
the Reduced Pool of 24 Items for Both Samples

1
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1
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the sixth step was to derive factor loadings for each of the items. To accomplish this,
a second factor analysis was performed, using a two-factor solution with an oblique
(oblimin) rotation. However, because this analysis revealed that the two factors were
again orthogonal (factor correlation =.070, 12=n.s.), the two-component solution was
rotated orthogonally (using a varimax rotation) to produce factor loadings.
The two-factor solution and the resulting rotated factor loadings (from the sixth
stage) were derived from the initial (or exploratory) sample only, and needed to be
cross-validated.

Therefore, -in the seventh stage of item selection, a principal

component analysis was repeated on the reduced item pool using the hold-out (or
validation) sample. Compared to the components in the initial sample (described in
the fifth stage), the components in the hold-out sample explained similar proportions
of total variance (see Table 8) and produced similar scree plots (see Figures 4 and 5).

In the eighth and final stage, orthogonally rotated factor loadings were derived
from the second sample. As can be seen in Table 9, there was a close correspondence
between the rotated factor loadings in both samples [Cattell's .S. (Factor 1) = .883,
Cattell' s .S. (factor 2) = . 832]. 8 (See Table 9 for factor loadings.) Based on the crossvalidation, only one additional item (number 19) was dropped because it loaded more
highly on different factors in the two samples.
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Table 9
V arimax Rotated Factor Loadini:S for the Reduced Pool of 24 Items by Factor and Sample
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Interpretation of P-Scale Factors
Given the close correspondence between factor loadings in each sample, the
samples were recombined and a single set of factor loadings was derived (see Table
10). An inspection of the items that load on each factor suggested that Factor 1 of
the P-scale represented participants'

~or

confidence in their own opinions (e.g.,

"I sometimes do not trust my own judgments," "I usually give into people because
I eventually realize they are right.") and that Factor 2 represented the nei:ative or
positive reactions participants have during attitude change (e.g., "I feel uncomfortable
if someone convinces me to adopt a new opinion," "It bothers me to change my
opinion.").
The interpretations given to these two factors echo two of the assumptions
made earlier when defining a highly persuasible person. It should be recalled that
highly persuasible people were assumed to be (a) more certainty-oriented, (b) more
likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people, (c) more apt to see
issues from different perspectives, (d) less confident of themselves and their attitudes,
(~)

less apt to see attitude change as negative and (t) less reactive in the protection of

current attitudes. The last three of these assumptions -- low self-confidence, the
tendency to see some benefits to attitude change, and the lack of defensive resistance
to attitude change -- are consistent with the interpretations that Factor 1 represented
self-doubt and that Factor 2 represented reactions to attitude change.
The above interpretations, however, are only subjective. To get a more
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Table 10
Final Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the Full Sample (N =312)

rmM.•·····
People win me over to their point of view.
I usually hold onto my opinions even when
other people hold the opposite opinions.
I usually feel confident about my beliefs.
I usually trust that my own opinions are right,
even when people try to change my mind.
In a discussion I probably change my mind
more easily than most people.
During discussions with people, I hold onto
my opinions more strongly than most other
people.
I've found that I am usually correct if I trust
my own judgment.
I put more trust in my judgment than in the
judgment of other people.
I sometimes do not trust my own judgment.
I usually "give in" to people because I
eventually realize they are right.
Compared to most people, I'm an
independent, free thinker.
Many times I am more convinced that my
opinions are correct after someone tries to
change my mind.
I almost always believe that my opinions are
correct.
Continued on the next page.

S1
Table 10 (Continued)

I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces
me to adopt a new opinion. .
Changing my opinions make me doubt by
integrity.
I get defensive when people try to change my
opinions.
Ususally I've felt uncomfortable when people
try to convince me of their ideas.

It bothers me to change my opinions.
./<·>,(i)? .<1

It is more important that people see my
point of view than it is for me to see things
from their point of view.
When people try to change my mind, I try
hard to prevent them from accomplishing it.
Rather than listening while people are
talking to me, I am usually thinking of things
to rebut what they are saying.
Usually I've wanted to do the opposite of
what people try to convince me to do.
I think people who change their opinions are
usually weak.

~:

Asterisks represent factor loadings with absolute values less than .40.
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objective interpretation of each factor, we computed scores on two scales. P-Scale 1
(Self-Doubt) was created by averaging together responses to the 13 items (numbers
2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) that had loadings with absolute
values greater than .40 on Factor 1 in the combined sample. All items were coded
such that higher scores on this scale represented ereater doubt in one's own attitudes.
P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) was created by averaging responses to the
10 items (numbers 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 32, 49, and 53) that had loadings with
absolute values greater than .40 on Factor 2. All items were coded such that high
scores represented positive reactions to attitude change, and low scores represented
negative reactions to attitude change.
After computing scores for P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2, each scale was correlated
with the various personality scales (see Table 11).

Consistent with subjective

interpretations, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) showed a strong negative relationship with selfesteem such that people who doubted their attitudes reported lower self-esteem.
Furthermore, people who doubted their attitudes tended to be more anxious and to get
less satisfaction from cognitive activity.
Consistent with the interpretation of P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change),
people who scored high on this scale tended to be less dogmatic and more open to
attitude change, less anxious, and better able to tolerate ambiguity.

People who

scored low on this scale appeared anxious, intolerant of ambiguity and perceived
attitude change as more negative. These findings suggest the P-Scale 2 represents the
emotional reactions participants had to changing their opinions. Higher scores on this
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Table 11
P-Scale 1 and P-ScaJe 2 Correlations with Personality Variables in the Full Sample

-.342
(306)

<.001

~:

-.182
(304)

.231
(301)

<.001

<.001

-.422
(308)

.222
(305)

<.001

<.001

.299
(309)

-.301
(306)

<.001

<.001

-.076
(309)

-.240
(306)

<.10

<.001

-.303
(303)

(300)

<.001

<.025

Correlations are in bold-faced type and
probability levels are in light-faced type.

.114
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scale appear to represent more acceptance of attitude change, whereas lower scores
represent the cognitive, emotional and behavioral rejection of attitude change.

Criterion-Related Validity of Paper-and-Pencil Measures
The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of the different
paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Specifically, analyses were performed
to see how accurately unbounded persuasibility scores could be predicted from the
Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility
Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to
Attitude Change). To accomplish this, scores on the PPI were computed by averaging
together scores on its three subscales (Ambiguity Intolerance, Dogmatism, and
Conformance)9, scores on the JFPQ were computed by averaging together responses
to its 11 items,

a~d

scores on each factor scale (Self-Doubt, and Reactions to Attitude

Change) were computed by averaging together responses to those items with loadings
greater than .40 in absolute value.
Although all of these measures produced acceptable levels of reliability (alphas:
PPI=.729, JFPQ=.737, P-Scale 1=.817, and P-Scale 2=.778), none of them
produced significant validity coefficients. (See Table 12 for correlations between
paper-and-pencil persuasibility measures and unbounded persuasibility scores.) Doubt
in one's attitudes (P-Scale 1), and negative reactions to attitude change (P-Scale 2)
tended to be associated with low persuasibility, but the correlations did not approach
acceptable levels of statistical significance. High scores on the PPI tended to be
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Table 12
Correlations Arnone Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Unbounded
Persuasibility Scores

UNBOUNDED
PERSUASIBILITY

-.034
(284)
<.30

P-SCALE 1: Self-Doubt

·················••l'
RQ·
-.089
(286)

.044
(282)
<.25

.045
(283)

<.25

<.10

.135

-.069
(309)
<.15

.582
(312)
<.001

-.284
(306)

-.097
(309)
<.05

(309)
<.01
P-SCALE 2: Reactions

<.001
PPI

.207

(311)
<.001

·oEs~<

STAlJSTi<:S ·..
Mean

2.356

3.383

3.637

2.112

Standard Deviation

.509.

.632

.526

.521

Obtained Range

2.923

3.600

2.808

2.636

Potential Range

4.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

Skew

.235

-.374

-.311

-.188

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced
type.
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associated with higher levels of unbounded persuasibility but, like P-Scale 1 and PScale 2, failed to correlate significantly with the criterion. It is interesting to note
that the JFPQ was negatively related (at a marginal level) to unbounded persuasibility
despite the fact that items were scored such that the JFPQ should have correlated
positively with the criterion. 10
The correlations among the four paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility
(see Table 12) represent the convergent validities of each measure. It is worth noting
that, with one exception, these scales seemed to measure largely independent
constructs. Only the P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and the JFPQ were strongly correlated.
All other correlations suggested that P-Scale 1, P-Scale 2, the PPI, and the JFPQ
were not measuring the same construct.

These findings call into question the

convergent validity of all paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility.
Although the paper-and-pencil measures failed to correlate significantly with
unbounded persuasibility scores, there was a possibility that these measures could
predict each of the four bounded persuasion scores, separately.

To test for this

possibility, we computed the correlations between the four paper-and-pencil measures
and four bounded persuasion scores. Results revealed, however, that P-Scale 1 (SelfDoubt) and P-Scale 2 (Affective Value of Attitude Change) failed to correlate with
any of the bounded persuasion scores. Furthermore, both the PPI and the JFPQ were
only slightly better predictors of bounded persuasion, correlating with only one of the
bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 13 for correlations between each paper-andpencil measure and each bounded persuasion scores.)
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Table 13
Correlations Among Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Bounded
Persuasion Scores

:_.;....

'Euthanasia
Persuasion Scores
Married Priests
Persuasion Scores
University Admissions
Persusion Scores
Drug Testing
Persuasion Scores

~:

·.

.

SelfDoubt

Reactions··
.. ·.·. to .
· Attitude
Change

-.062

-.020
(276)
<.40

(287)
<.40

-.038
(290)
<.30

.081
(273)
<.10

.030
(284)
<.30

-.009
(287)
<.50

(278)
<.25

-.038
(266)
<.30

.114
(277)
<.05

-.034
(280)
<.30

-.051

.050

(281)
<.20

(269)
<.20

-.008
(280)
<.50

-.144
(283)
<.01

(288)
<.15
.021

(285)
<.40
.040

-.017

Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced type.
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As a follow up analysis, separate validity coefficients were computed for
women and men. Although these analyses revealed that the correlations between
unbounded persuasibility, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude
Change) did not differ for women and men, the analyses also revealed that scores on
both the PPI and JFPQ were more predictive for women than for men. (See Table
14 for validity coefficients by gender.) Unlike men, women who scored higher on
the PPI were more open to persuasion than women who scored lower on the PPL
Moreover,

w~men

who scored higher on the JFPQ were less open to persuasion than

women who scored lower on the JFPQ. This last finding is surprising because JFPQ
scores were expected to correlate positively with persuasion.

D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The findings suggest that unbounded persuasibility is a modest personality trait;
people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by
different messages on different issues. As evidence of this, there was a significant
correlation (I=. 21, 12 < .025) between the amount of persuasion produced by one
message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages. However, the
size of the relationship was modest and explained less than 5 % of the variance in
bounded persuasion scores.
The findings also suggest that predicting who will '

~

)pen to messages and

who will be resistant is remarkably difficult. Although women were more open to
persuasion than men on one topic (drug testing), unbounded persuasibility could not
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Table 14
Correlations Amon~ Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Unbounded
Persuasibility Scores b.y Gender

Self- ·
Doubt

-.026
(191)
<.35
-.034
( 92)
<.40

·.058
(190)

<.21
.012
( 91)
<.45

.111
(190)
<.10

-.123
(193)
<.05

.085
( 92)

.013
( 92)
<.45

<.21

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type, and probabilities are in light-faced type.
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be predicted accurately from gender, even when controlling for individual differences
in interest in the topic. In addition, using either linear or curvilinear equations,
individual differences in unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted from
participants' dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, or need-forcognition. Finally, unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted accurately from
four paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure persuasibility. Scores on
P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) were not at all
related to unbounded persuasibility; scores on the JFPQ were (surprisingly) negatively
related to persuasibility, but only for women; and, scores on the PPI were positively
related to persuasibility, but again only for women.
In the entire study, only ambiguity intolerance showed a consistent relationship
with unbounded persuasibility: both men and women who were . intolerant of
contradictions among their beliefs were more open to persuasion than people who
were unbothered by contradictions. Based on these findings, we can safely conclude
that, at this point, there are no consistently valid paper-and-pencil measures of
persuasibility. Although people do differ in their general openness to persuasion, no
measures seem capable of predicting these individual differences for both men and
women.

IV. DISCUSSION

Research on individual differences in unbounded persuasibility is surprisingly
rare in social psychology. Only a small number of researchers in the last 30 years
have studied whether people differ in openness to persuasion, and what factors might
relate to such differences. Research in persuasibility is like research in any other
sparsely studied area: the research questions are not well integrated and the findings
are inconclusive.
The current study tried to add integration and conclusiveness to research on
unbounded persuasibility by addressing three issues.

First, the current study

addressed the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition.
Second, the relationships between persuasibility and numerous personality variables
were addressed. Last, the current study addressed the validity of three paper-andpencil scales that were designed to measure individual differences in persuasibility.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.

A. UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY AS A TRAIT
Is unbounded persuasibility strong enough to merit serious attention by attitude
change researchers? Clearly, the evidence from this and earlier studies weighs against
looking closer at unbounded persuasibility. Given the modest correlations among
bounded persuasion scores in this and other studies, unbounded persuasibility might
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not deserve serious attention.

If, as this study found, approximately 5 % of the

variance in persuasion produced by one message is related to persuasion produced by
other messages, then researchers might be justified in ignoring persuasibility as a
research area.
However, there are two reasons why ignoring persuasibility might be
premature. First, all studies of persuasibility (including this one) have found that
people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by another
message. Although the relationship is small, it has enormous implications for the
understanding of attitude change. Even the most basic principals of persuasion might
need to be re-evaluated in light of individual differences in persuasibility.

For

instance, a long-standing principal holds that expert sources on a topic are more
persuasive than novice sources (cf., Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, 1963; Hovland &
Weiss, 1952). Individual differences in persuasibility, however, might force a new
look at this principal to see if speakers who are novices on a topic might be as
persuasive as expert sources when the message recipient is highly persuasible. If
persuasibility affects even the most basic principals of persuasion, then turning our
eyes away from unbounded persuasibility would be accepting a blind spot in our view
of the persuasion process.
Second, the small size of the correlation among bounded persuasion scores in
this study might be an artifact that is peculiar to laboratory studies in general, and to
this study in particular. The current study used a fairly homogeneous sample (i.e, 18
and 19 year old undergraduates), and presented participants with four counter-
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attitudinal editorials. By using such a homogeneous sample, we may have reduced
the variability of bounded persuasion scores, thereby restricting the range of the
correlations among these scores. Moreover, and more likely, by using only counterattitudinal editorials, we may have restricted the range of variability among unbounded
persuasibility scores. As shown in Table 1, the variance of unbounded persuasibility
scores was almost 50% smaller than the variance of any of the bounded persuasion
scores. Perhaps participants who were normally open to persuasion in their daily lives
became

unus~ally

resistant to persuasion in an experimental setting that presented

them exclusively with counter-attitudinal editorials.

Basing our impressions of

unbounded persuasibility on studies conducted in highly reactive laboratory settings
may distort our view of unbounded persuasibility.

B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY
Implicit in many theories that link personality variables to attitude change is the
notion the personality variables will also relate to persuasibility.

For example,

Cacioppo and Petty (1982) suggest that individual differences in need-for-cognition
should relate to individual differences in the responses (i.e., yielding) to a given
message. However, to generalize their theory to a wide range of messages, one has
to assume that need-for-cognition will also relate to people's responses to a variety of
messages. The same is true of any other individual difference variable. There is a
small, but inevitable leap from attitude change theories to persuasibility theories.
This study found that several individual difference variables were not related
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to unbounded persuasibility. Neither gender, dogmatism, social desirability, selfesteem, anxiety, or need-for-cognition were related to unbounded persuasibility.
Furthermore, these variables were only rarely related to levels of bounded persuasion.
As shown in Table 5, only ambiguity intolerance and self-esteem were related to
bounded persuasibility scores.
This gloomy conclusion, however, must be tempered. Although this study
found that many individual difference variables were unrelated to unbounded
persuasibility (or even bounded persuasion), earlier studies have uncovered some
pronounced relationships. For example, Cronkhite and Goetz (1971) reported that
dogmatism correlated .40 with persuasibility, whereas the current study found that
dogmatism correlated .00 with persuasibility. The source of this discrepancy might
lie in methodological differences in how the two studies operationalized persuasibility.
Cronkhite and Goetz operationalized persuasibility by exposing participants to five
counter-attitudinal editorials and five

pro-~ttitudinal

editorials, whereas the current

study used only four counter-attitudinal editorials.

If the latter method of

operationalizing persuasibility induced unusual levels of reactance and range
restriction, we cannot accept the blanket conclusion that individual difference variables rarely relate to persuasibility. 11

C. PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY
In the history of social psychology, only three attempts (Janis & Field, 1959;
Phillips, 1981; and the current study) have been made to develop paper-and-pencil
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measures of persuasibility, and none of those attempts have succeeded. In the current
study, only one measure -- the PPI -- showed even a modest relationship with
persuasibility. Moreover, that relationship held only for women and was not large
enough for us to make reasonably accurate predictions as to who was open to a variety
of persuasive messages and who was resistant to such messages.
The modest success of the PPI and the failure of the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 (SelfDoubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) point to some future directions
in the development of a valid paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. The PPI
was built from items whose intent (to measure persuasibility) was not transparently
obvious to participants. Using item #1 from the PPI as an example, only the most
sophisticated participants would realize that the PPI was intended to measure
persuasibility by asking if "the ideas which get printed nowadays are worth the paper
they are printed _on."
On the other hand, the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2 were built from items
whose intents were far more transparent. These scales asked participants very directly
a~mut

their susceptibility to attitude change.

For example, the JFPQ included

questions asking participants how influenced they are by their friends, P-Scale 1
included items that asked participants how often they are "won over" to the point of
view of other people, and P-Scale 2 included items that asked participants how
comfortable they feel when people try to persuade them.
All of these "transparent" measures of persuasibility failed. In fact, the JFPQ
tended to "backfire." People who admitted to being open to persuasion were actually
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resistant to messages, and people who denied being susceptible were actually
susceptible to persuasive messages. Therefore, this study suggests that future attempts
to measure persuasibility use less transparent items.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In recent years, researchers have been casting new looks at individual
differences in persuasion. Very few researchers, however, have looked at unbounded
persuasibility to learn why some people are generally more open to a variety of
messages.

Given that this and earlier studies strongly suggest that unbounded

persuasibility may be, at best, a modest contributor to individual differences in
persuasion, unbounded persuasibility may remain in the shadows and generate very
little future research.
Although understandable, this would be unfortunate because of the theoretical
importance of persuasibility. Thus, unbounded persuasibility should not remain in the
shadows forever. Future research is needed to clarify why some people are, in fact,
more open to messages in general than are other people. At the same time, however,
researchers should take great care when planning future studies. Future researchers
are advised to take extraordinary precautions when planning studies of unbounded
persuasibility. To ensure that there is enough variance in unbounded persuasibility
scores, researchers should avoid using homogeneous populations (such as only college
freshman) and should not use exclusively counter-attitudinal editorials. By using more
diverse populations and including some pro-attitudinal editorials, future researchers
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might increase the range of persuasibility scores.
Another recommendation for future researchers is to focus closer attention on
bounded persuasibility. Rather than focus on unbounded persuasibility and whether
some people can be persuaded all of the time, future researchers should focus on
bounded persuasibility and the conditions under which some of the people can be
persuaded some of the time. Toward that end, the functional theories can cast some
light on why some people might be more susceptible to certain types of messages.
Early functional theorists (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956) pointed out that
messages will only be persuasive if they appeal to the psychological needs being
served by particular attitudes. The more researchers know about the functions being
served by an attitude, the more likely they will understand why some people can be
persuaded with certain types of message whereas others are unpersuaded by those
same messages.
Recent research by Snyder and Debono (1987) is a good example of how
functional theories can be applied to individual differences in bounded persuasibility.
These investigators found that high self-monitors (people who were especially
concerned about attaining social approval) were more persuaded by advertisements
that stressed the social attributes of a product (e.g., the popularity to be gained
through its use) than by advertisements that stressed a product's physical attributes
(e.g., quality and craftsmanship). Conversely, they also found that low self-monitors
(people who were less concerned about attaining social approval) were less persuaded
by advertisements that stressed the product's social attributes than by advertisements
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that stressed the product's physical attributes. These findings suggest that researchers
should focus their attention on bounded persuasibility and the personality variables
(such as self-monitoring) that leave people open to one kind of message, but resistant
to other kinds of messages.

E. SUMMARY
After his earliest research on persuasibility, Janis (1954) envisioned that
" ... some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be
eventually isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as
to how different individuals will respond to various discrete
communications on different topics" (p. 506).
To date only part of that vision has been fulfilled. This study, like the few that
preceded it, did succeed in isolating a general factor of unbounded persuasibility,
finding that people who were persuaded by a message on one topic tended to be
persuaded by other messages on unrelated topics.

However, the strength of the

unbounded persuasibility factor appears weaker than perhaps Janis (and the current
author) expected.
The second part of Janis' vision has not yet come true. Previous studies have
not uncovered factors on which to make accurate predictions about who will resist and
who will accept messages on different topics.

With the exception of ambiguity

intolerance, the current study also failed to find any personality variables or any
paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility that could predict accurately individual
differences in unbounded persuasibility.
The two parts of Janis' vision are not unrelated. Researchers will never be able
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to uncover accurate predictors and measures of persuasibility until they are able to
identify a stronger persuasibility trait. This may never happen because unbounded
persuasibility may not be a strong personality trait. On the other hand, accurate
predictors and measures might be uncovered if more heterogeneous populations and
potentially less reactive methods of operationalizing persuasibility are used. This
study cannot untangle whether unbounded persuasibility has so few predictors because
(a) there is, in fact, only a small and unreliable relationship between levels of attitude
change across topics, or (b) current methods artificially restrict the range of
persuasibility scores, thereby truncating all subsequent correlations with unbounded
persuasibility.
As is usually the case, more research is needed.

We need more careful

research on unbounded persuasibility, particularly research that uses less reactive
methods of operationalizing unbounded persuasibility. We also need more research
on bounded persuasibility in order to identify the conditions that leave some people
susceptible to some messages some of the time.
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ENDNOTES

1.

Eagly (1981) provides another way of classifying research on individual
differences in persuasion. She classified research as falling into one of three
camps. First there are those who approach individual differences in persuasion
armed with personality theories. As an example, Eagly includes in this camp
researchers who have suggested that individual differences in persuasion are
caused by personality differences in self-esteem. Second, there are those who
approach persuasibility armed with attitude theories. For instance, Eagly cites
Sherif and Hovland's (1961) social judgment theory as an example. According
to social judgment theory, people who maintain an attitude with a wide latitude
of acceptance will be easier to persuade than those who have narrower ranges of
acceptance. Finally, there are those who combine both personality theories and
attitude

theo~es

in an attempt to understand persuasibility. The best example

from this camp is McGuire's (1985) theory which claims that a personality
variable (such as self-esteem) may increase persuasion by increasing the amount
of attention a person donates to a message, but simultaneously decrease persuasion
by decreasing the chance that a person will accept a message.

2. The work of Janis and Field (1959) stimulated only a handful of studies that
assessed attitude change across multiple topics. Although these studies invariably
compute unbounded persuasibility scores by adding together persuasion scores
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produced by several different messages, two problems make it difficult to compare
across studies the correlations among persuasion scores. The major problem is
that, in general, correlations among persuasion scores have not been reported by
most researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Glass et al., 1969;
Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Silverman et al., 1970; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker &
Meade, 1967). Another problem is that those researchers who have reported the
correlations among persuasion scores (Epting, 1967; Lee, 1976; Touhey, 1973)
have used such widely different techniques to induce persuasion that comparison
among correlations is difficult. Touhey induced persuasion by having participants
write two counter-attitudinal editorials.

Using this self-persuasion technique,

Touhey reported an unusually strong correlation of .47 between two persuasion
scores. Epting used contrived results from two sets of opinion polls to induce
persuasion. This technique produced a correlation between persuasion scores of
.37.

Only Lee induced persuasion by having participants read editorials on

several topics. Using this more traditional approach, Lee found that persuasion
scores were correlated only .14.

3. The size of the internal consistency of unbounded persuasibility scores is based on
correlations between attitude change scores across several topics. Although the
exact correlations are often not reported in past research, earlier researchers have
described modest correlations among the persuasion scores produced by different
messages. The modest correlations among persuasion scores is reminiscent of

83
Mischel's (1984) contention that there is only modest correlations among
behaviors that any one person produces in different situations.

4. Rather than use all 45 items from the Need For Cognition Scale, 16 items were
selected to serve as an abbreviated version of this scale. The items (numbers 1,
10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, and 43 from the original
scale) were selected based on the size of the item-total correlations reported in two
studies by Cacioppo and Petty (1982, p. 123)

5. Some additional mention should be given to the ordering of materials in the first
and second sessions. Given the amount of effort required of participants in this
study it was impossible to include all persuasibility and personality measures in
a single session. Therefore, a choice was made to include in the first session only
the attitude scales, the paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility (i.e., the PPI,
JFPQ, and the P-Scale) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
The paper-and-pencil measures were purposely excluded from the second
session because we wanted to eliminate the possibility that respondents would
infer their general level of persuasibility from how much they changed their
attitudes in the experimental session.

If the paper-and-pencil measures were

included in the second session, a potential self-perception bias that might have
artificially inflated the correlation between the paper-and-pencil measures and the
criterion of unbounded persuasibility.
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There was, however, a disadvantage with this ordering. By completing the
persuasibility measures in the first session, participants might have been
forewarned of impending attitude change attempts. This forewarning might have
led participants to bolster their attitudes before they received counter-attitudinal
messages, thereby making them less open to persuasion. The end result might
have been (a) that the range among unbounded persuasibility scores was restricted
and (b) that all subsequent correlations between bounded persuasibility scores and
any other variable were attenuated by that restricted range.
Another point about the ordering of materials should be mentioned. With the
exception of the P-Scale always being the first instrument in the first session, all
other materials were randomly ordered within the sessions. That is, the PPI,
JFPQ, and MCSD scales were randomly ordered for participants during the first
session, and the various personality scales were randomly ordered for the second
session.

6. Whenever multiple items (such as item-change scores) had to be combined, items
were averaged together rather than summed together. This strategy was selected
to minimize the effect of missing data. If several items were summed together,
missing data would have spuriously lowered the respondent's total "sum score,"
making them appear less affected by the message than they might have been. Of
course, missing data could have been handled by disqualifying participants who
had missing data.

However, this strategy would have disqualified from all
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subsequent analyses anyone who had missing data on only one item. Averaging
items together avoided these two problems, producing more accurate scores for
participants and retaining participants who had missing data on some items.
Nevertheless, a participant's data was disqualified if more than 20% of the items
being averaged were blank.

7.

It remained possible that bounded persuasion scores would be more strongly

correlated if the effect of "issue importance" were factored out of each persuasion
scores. It was reasoned that the more important an issue was to a participant, the
less open to persuasion that participant would be.

By affecting the size of

bounded persuasion scores, issue importance could have affected the size of the
correlation among persuasion scores.
Because all subsequent analyses in this study were directly affected by the size
of the correlation among bounded pers11asion scores, preliminary analyses were
conducted into the effects of "issue importance" on bounded persuasion scores.
First, the importance of each issue (at the time of the first session) was correlated
with the level of persuasion produced by each editorial.

Surprisingly, only

nonsignificant correlations between issue importance and bounded persuasion
scores were found [average

r (283) = .034, 12=n.s.]. These correlations suggest

that "issue importance" had virtually no effect on bounded persuasion scores and
that "issue importance" would not affect the size of the correlations among
bounded persuasion scores.
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Second, the small effect of "issue importance" was factored out before
correlating the four bounded persuasion scores. This was done by regressing each
persuasion score on "issue importance" scores and then creating residualized
persuasion scores. For example, each participant's "euthanasia persuasion score"
was regressed on the importance placed on that issue, and a "residualized
euthanasia persuasion score." After creating residualized persuasion scores for
each issue, the correlations among these scores were then computed. Because the
average correlation among residualized persuasion scores (r = . 20) was no different
than the average correlation among the non-residualized persuasion scores
(r =. 21), "issue importance" was not used as a covariate in any subsequent

analyses.

8.

Cattell' s .S. .reflects the correspondence between factor loadings in different
samples. The closer

.S comes to 1.00, the closer the correspondence between

factor loadings.

9. Although the PPI consisted of three subscales, these subscales were combined
into a total PPI score because (a) Phillips (1981) designed the PPI to be used in
this manner, and (b) previous uses of the PPI (Phillips, 1981; Pietscher, 1984)
combined the PPI' s three subscales into a single score.

10. The predictive validity of each item in the P-Scale, the PPI, and the JFPQ was
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also examined. This was done by (a) randomly splitting the total sample into
two halves, (b) computing separately for each half of the sample the correlations
between each item and the criterion measure of unbounded persuasibility, and (c)
comparing the item-criterion correlations from each sample in order to see which
items had significant item-criterion correlations in QQ!h samples. This approach,
however, was no more successful than examining the criterion validities of total
scale scores for the pooled sample. Only four items from the P-Scale (numbers
24, 34, 38 and 60), one item from the PPI (number 26), and no items from the
JFPQ had correlations greater than .10 in both samples.

11. The problems with the restricted range of unbounded persuasibility scores might
explain this study's overall inability to find accurate predictors of persuasibility.
There are two potential causes of restricted range in this study; one
methodological, and one theoretical. First, the combination of potentially reactive
methods and a homogeneous sample may have truncated the range of unbounded
persuasibility scores. This methodological problem might account for the lack of
significant correlations.
unbounded

A second, and more theoretical possibility is that

persuasibility scores might have regressed

inward because

persuasibility might, in fact, be only a modest personality trait. If, beyond the
confines of the current study, the amount of persuasion produced by one message
is not strongly related to amount of persuasion produced by other messages, a
person's average persuasion score (i.e., unbounded persuasibility) would regress
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toward zero.
Given the restricted range in this study, there was some temptation to
"correct" the correlations between unbounded persuasibility scores and other
measures for range restriction, thereby increasing the number of significant
predictors of persuasibility.

However, correction formulas (see Alexander,

Carson, Alliger & Carr, 1987) were not used given the important (and likely)
theoretical possibility that unbounded persuasibility is, in fact, only a modest
personality trait.

APPENDIX A:
GOALS, METHODS, AND
FINDINGS OF PILOT STUDIES

STUDY 1: IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE ISSUES
Wood and Stangor (in press) suggest that the more ambiguous the issue, the
more likely one's personality will affect the acceptance or rejection of a message.
Therefore, the goal of the first pilot study was to identify social issues about which
undergraduates felt ambivalently and could just as easily support one view as support
another. To accomplish this, 40 introductory psychology students read statements on
32 controversial topics. For example, participants were shown a statement claiming
that hospital patients with AIDS should be isolated on a separate AIDS unit.
Participants were than given 15 seconds to access their reasons, if any, for supporting
each statement (e.g., to think of reasons to support isolating AIDS patients), and 15
seconds to access their reasons for opposing each statement. Participants were then
asked to use 5-points scale to indicate how ~sily (1 =difficultly, 5 =easily) supporting
beliefs came to mind, and how easily opposing beliefs came to mind.
This procedure made it possible to identify issues for which undergraduates
could access supporting beliefs as easily as opposing beliefs. Although equal access
of both supporting and opposing beliefs could arise from a host of factors (such as
familiarity with the issue), we reasoned that equal access to both supporting and
opposing beliefs was one sign of ambivalence in attitudes.
Based on this logic, five out of the original 32 issues were selected for further
use because participants could just as easily generate supporting and opposing beliefs.
Specifically, for each of the five issues, the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs
· did not differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs, all two-
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tailed t's

<

1.63, 12's > .10.

The selected issues involved the use of active

euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, mandatory drug testing, open admissions
policies at public universities, and increased government support for the homeless.
All other issues were rejected because the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs did
differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs.

STUDY 2: IDENTIFYING SALIENT BELIEFS
The goal of the second study was to generate a pool of cogent arguments that
could be used to change a person's attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, open
admissions, drug testing, housing shelters.

To accomplish this, 29 introductory

psychology students wrote down the various beliefs they had about each of the five
experimental topics.

Participants spent three minutes writing down beliefs that

supported a particular position on an issue (e.g. beliefs that favor the use of
euthanasia) and three minutes writing down beliefs that opposed that position (e.g.,
beliefs that argued against euthanasia). After generating a series of supporting and
opposing beliefs toward each issue, participants evaluated the cogency of each belief
by assigning it a grade from A (a very persuasive belief) to F (a very unpersuasive
belief).
Although no quantitative analyses were performed on the responses, it was
possible to identify the most common and cogent beliefs that undergraduates held
about the five issues. After reading and sorting through the responses, many of the
underlying beliefs were later incorporated into ten editorials. Some of these beliefs
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were used in editorials that favored euthanasia, married priests, open admissions, drug
testing, and housing shelters (referred to at "Pro" editorials), whereas other beliefs
were incorporated into editorials that opposed these issues (referred to as "Con"
editorials).

STUDY 3: PERSUASIVENESS OF EDITORIALS
After the second pilot study, several Likert-style statements and semanticdifferential pairs were devised to measure attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests,
open admissions, housing shelters, and drug testing. (See Appendix B for copies of
all items.) To assess the reliability and validity of these measures, introductory
psychology students responded to each item. Table 15 lists the internal consistencies
of the Likert-style and the semantic differential items, as well as the correlation
between the two scales for each of the experimental issues. As can be seen, all items
were internally consistent and the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales were
strongly related.
Another goal of this pilot study was to evaluate the editorials (see Appendix C).
Specifically, we needed to ensure that the "pro" and "con" editorials for each issue
successfully manipulated attitudes without using widely different styles. To evaluate
the editorials, participants were randomly assigned to read either a "pro" or "con"
editorial on each of the five topics. They then rated each editorial on 21 different
stylistic dimensions and completed the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales.
Table 16 lists the t-values for the differences between the "pro" and "con" editorials
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Table 15
Coefficient Alphas for. and Pearson Correlations Between Likert-style and SemanticDifferentials Attitude Measures on Five Experimental Tcwics
·

Alpha
Topic
Active Euthanasia
Married Priests
Open Admissions
Aid to the Homeless
Mandatory Drug Tests

Likert-style
Scale
.91
.95
.96
.90
.88

Semantic
Differential
.96
.97
.97
.94
.96

.87
.82
.86

.72
• 77

.001
.001
.001
.001
• 001

94
Table 16
Values oft for Differences Between Five "Pro" and "Con" Editorial Alon& Two
Attitude Measures and 21 Style Dimensions
~XPERIMEN'.IAL ~QEI~S

Likert Scale
Semantic Differ.
EDITORIAL ...
Persuasiveness
Powerfulness
Convincingness
Logicality
Emotionality
Truthfulness
Simplicity
Clarity
Bias
Fairness
One-sidedness
Humorousness
Interestingness
No. of arguments
CONCLUSION ...
Clarity
Strength
Implicitness
WRITER ...
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Powerfulness
Likability
El
E2
E3
E4
ES

represents
represents
represents
represents
represents

the
the
the
the
the

E2

E3

E4

ES

2.74
2.72

4.47
3.04

6.30
6.04

5.00
5.06

3.56
1. 78

1. 81
1.25
2.43*
1. 76
-1.52
1.05
.74
.63
.59
2.21*
-1.67
.19
- .05
.82

-1.63
- .44
-1.45
-1.04
3.71**
.98
2.11*
-1.45
1.34
.50
.59
.52
1.63
.83

.62
.05
1.43
.31
1.85
- .04
.39
.94
.76
.17

-

-

- .so
- .08
1.04
- .31

-

.58
.80

.69
.76
1. 26

.so
.85
.86
-1. 23
.34

-

two
two
two
two
two

H.QTE:

El

-

-

.22
.41
.12
.38

editorials
editorials
editorials
editorials
editorials

on
on
on
on
on

-

2.49*
1.50
3.12**
3.37**
-1.09
2.51*
.52

-

.oo

-2.19*
1.99*
-1.36
- .26
.51
1.29

-1. 21
- .4S
1.17

.64
1.S2
.57

.13
.85
.65
.61

-1.70
.47
- .30
.44

-

-

-

-

-

5.18**
4.61**
4.34**
2.80*
2.31*
3.98**
.19
3.06**
.77
2.49*
.24
.47
3.49**
.12

--

3.61**
4.4S**
- .18
-1.62
.98
1.69
2.16*

active euthanasia.
marriage for priests.
open admissions policies.
mandatory drug testing.
more aid for the homeless.

Items composing the Likert scales and semantic differentials were recoded so that higher values represent more support
for the experimental topics.
Positive (negative) t-values indicate the "Pro" ("Con")
editorial was rated higher than the "Con" ("Pro") editorial on a
given dimension.

**
*

R<.01, two-tailed
R<.OS, two-tailed
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on the two attitude scales and the 21 different dimensions.

As can be seen, the

editorials on four of the five issues did manipulate attitudes in the intended direction,
without differing along the majority of style dimensions. Only the editorials dealing
with shelter for the homeless differed in style, and had to be dropped from further
use. In all, this third pilot study ensured 1) that attitude measures for this proposal
were internally consistent and highly correlated, and 2) that the editorials were, in
fact, persuasive.

STUDY 4: PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF THE P-SCALE.
The last pilot study began the preliminary analysis of the P-Scale. In this last
pilot study, 51 introductory psychology students were presented with a preliminary
version of a newly devised persuasibility scale (see Appendix D). Results revealed
that the P-Scale had sufficient internal consistency to merit additional research,
coefficient alpha=. 85.

APPENDIX B:
ATTITUDE SCALES

Attitudes Toward Euthanasia Scale

ACTIVE EUTHANASIA
Recently the medical profession and religious leaders have
debated the use of active eu~hanasia
where doctors
actually help terminally ill patients die by counseling the
patients and then giving them a lethal dose of medication.
Many people support active euthanasia and see it as a
necessary "mercy killing".
others, however, oppose active
euthanasia, saying it is not merciful.
We are interested in discovering what people know about
active euthanasia and how they feel about it. Please answer
the questions on this and the following page.

1.

Before today, how much had you
heard about active euthanasia?

!=none
2=very little
J=a fair amount
4=very much

2.

How important is this topic
to you before today?

!=very unimportant
2=unimportant
3=hard to decide
4=important
5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about active euthanasia,
even if you have heard very little about it.
Please read
the statements on the following page and indicate how
strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7point scale on the top of following page to answer each
question.
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DISAGREE
AGREE
VERY
DISAGREE
AGREE
VERY
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER
AGREE
Strongly Strongly
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7
There are good reasons to support active
(physician-assisted) euthanasia.
2. There are good reasons to oppose active
(physician-assisted) euthanasia.
3~
All things considered, the reasons for
opposing active euthanasia are stronger
than the reasons for supporting it.
4.
Physicians should be banned from helping
a terminally-ill patient die, even if the
patient wants to die.
5.
If both the physician and patient agree,
physicians should help a terminally ill
patient die.
6.
It is a doctor's duty to prevent death
whenever possible.
7. Active euthanasia goes against the goals
of the medical profession.
8. Terminally ill patients have the right
to end their suffering.
9. The patient's wish to die should outweigh
all other consideration.
10. In many cases, active euthanasia is the
only humane thing to do.
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THERE ARE 14 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAR BE USED TO DESCRIBE
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT ACTIVE EUTHANASIA. FOR EACH OF THESE 14 PAIRS,
PLACE AN •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA.
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA IS ••.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10
11.
12.
13.

------

Good

Valuable
I•portant
Helpful
Needed
Fair
Unethical
Inhwaane
Cruel
Misguided
Foolish
A Proble•
HURTS
MEDICINE
14. Within a
patient's
riqhts

-- :: - - :: - - :: - - :: -- :: - - :: - --:--:--: --: --: --:-- - : -- : - - : - - : - - : - - : - -- : - - : - - : - - : - - : - - : - -- : - - : - - : - - : - - : - - : - -

--: --: -- : --:--: --: --- -- -- -- -- -- -- - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: -- :: - -- : - - : - - : - - : - - : - - : - - - - - - - - - -- - - - --: --

.

-- .-- : --

-- : -- : --

Bad
Worthless
Uni•portant
Hanaful
Not Needed
Unfair
Ethical
Humane
Merciful
Well Thought out
Wise
An Answer
HELPS
MEDICINE.
outside a
patient's
riqhta
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Attitudes Toward Married Priests Scale

MARRIED PRIESTS
Recently many Catholics have ar<JUed about whether priests
should be allowed to get married and have children.
Some
believe that allowing priests to marry would be good for the
Church.
However others, believing that it will harm the
Church, have argued that the Church should keep its long
tradition of Wllllarried priests.
We are interested in discovering what people know about
the debate over married priests and how people feel about
married priests.
Please answer the questions on this and
the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you
heard about allowing priests
to marry?

l=none
2=very little
3=a fair amount
4=very auch

2. How iaportant is this topic
to you, today?

l=very uniaportant
2=uni•portant
J=hard to decide
4=important
5=very important

We would like to know your op1m.on about iaarriage in the
Catholic priesthood, even if you have heard very little
about this issue.
Please read the statements on the
following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or
agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of
'the following page to answer each question.
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AGREE
DISAGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
VERY
VERY
Strongly Strongly
AGREE
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7
There are good reasons to support marriage
for Catholic priests.
There are good reasons to oppose marriage
2.
for Catholic priests.
3. All things considered, the reasons to
support marriage for priests are ~tronger
the reasons to oppose such marriages.
4. Marriage for priests probably goes against
the teachings in the Bible.
5.
I can see very few reasons for allowing
priests to marry.
It would help the Catholic church if
6.
priests were allowed to marry.
7.
It would hurt Catholic church-goers i f
priests were allowed to marry.
8. It would hurt the profession of the
priesthood if priests could :marry.
9. The Church should not break a long-standing
tradition of single priests.
10. The tradition of single prief?tS is outdated.
1.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

THERE ARE 14 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS.
FQR EACH OF THESE
14 PAIRS, PLACE AM •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR FEELINGS
ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS.
MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS IS ...
1.

Good

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10

Valuable
I•portant
Helpful
Needed
Fair
Unethical
Inhwaane
Cruel
Misguided
Foolish
A Proble•
HURTS THE
CHURCH
Within a
priest's
rights

11.

12.
13.

14.

- - :: -- :: -- :: - - :: - - :: -- :: -- - : -- : -- : - - : -- : - - : - - - - - -- -- -- - - --- :: - - :: - - :: - - :: -- :: -- :: - -- -- -- - - - - - - -- - : -- :: - - :: - - :: -- :: -- :: -- - : -- : - - : -- : - - : - - : - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - - :: - -- -- -- -- -- -- --

.

--: --: --: -- : --:--: --

.

-- .-- : -- : -- : - - : - - : --

Bad
Worthless
Uni:aportant
Harw.f ul
Not Needed
Unfair
Ethical
Hwaape
Merciful
Well Thought out
Wise
An Answer
HELPS THE
CHURCH.
outside a
priest's
rights
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Attitudes Toward Open Admissions Scale

OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
One issue that is frequently debated by education experts is
whether publicly funded universities, like the University of
Illinois, should admit all. Illinois residents who apply.
This •open door policy• is controversial because there would
be no requirements (such as acceptable high school grades or
standard
test
scores)
to
enter
public
universities.
supporters of the policy argue that publicly funded schools
should accept anyone in the public who wants to attend.
Critics argue that state universities would becoae overcrowded and public education would suffer.
We are interested in discovering what people know about
open admissions and how they feel about it.
Please answer
the questions on this and the following page.

1.

Before today, how much had you
heard about open admissions?

l=none
2=very little
3=a fair 8JllOunt
4=very much

2.

How iaportant is this topic
to you, today?

l=very uni•portant
2=uni•portant
3=hard to decide
4=iaportant
5=very i•portant

We would like to know your opinion about open ad.Jlissions at

publicly funded universities, even if you know very little
about it.
Please read the stateaents on the following page
and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each.
Please use the 7-point scale on the top of the following
page to answer each question.
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DISAGREE
VERY
Strongly

DISAGREE
Strongly

DISAGREE

NEITHER

AGREE
VERY
Strongly

AGREE
Strongly

AGREE

1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7

There are good reasons to support the
•open aditissions policy.•
2. There are good reasons to oppose the
•open aditissions policy.•
3. All things condisered, the reasons for
supporting •open admissions• are stronger
than the reasons for opposing it.
4. State universities should adopt ~ •open
admissions policy.•
5. There is very little to gain by adopting
the •open admissions policy.•
6. Many benefits would.come if the •open
admissions policy• was adopted.
7. Open admissions would make a mess of state
universities.
8. State universities would suffer if open
admissions is adopted.
9.
Public universities must keep some selective standards when deciding who to a<hlit.
10. The state owes each citizen a chance at
higher education, even citizens who will
probably fail.
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THERE ARE 14 PARIS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAM BE USED TO DESCRIBE

YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES.
FOR EACH
OF THESE 14 PAIRS, PLACE AN •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS HOW
YOU FEEL ABOUT OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES.
1.

Good

THE OPEN ADMISSIONS POLICY (IS)
_ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ Bad

Valuable
Important
Helpful
Needed
Fair
Unethical
Inhu.ane
Cruel
Misguided
Foolish
12. A Problem
13. HURTS THE
SCHOOLS
14. Within a
citizen's
rights
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10
11.
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Worthless
Unimportant
Har.tu!
Not Needed
Unfair
Ethical

Humane
Merciful
Well Thought out
Wise
An Answer
HELPS THE
SCHOOLS
outside a
citizen's
rights
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Attitudes Toward Drug Testing Scale

MANDATORY DRUG TESTING
In the past few years there has been much debate over the
use of mandatory on-the-job drug tests for employees. Those
who favor these tests argue that drug testing will help keep
drugs and accidents out of the work place. Those who oppose
drug testing argue that the tests are inaccurate and an
invasion of privacy.
We are interested in discovering what people know about
aandatory drug testing and how they feel about it.
Please
answer the questions on this and the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you
heard about mandatory drug tests?

l=none
2=very little
J=a fair amount
4=very much

2. How important is this topic to
you, today?

l=very unimportant
2=unimportant
J=hard to decide
4= important
5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about mandatory drug
tests for employees of private companies, even if you have
heard very little about this topic.
Please read the state11ents on the fol lowing page and indicate how strongly you
disagree or agree with each.
Please use the 7-point scale
on the top of the !ollowinq page to answer each question.
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DISAGREE
AGREE
VERY
DISAGREE
AGREE
VERY
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER
AGREE
Strongly Strongly
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7
1.

There are good reasons to oppose mandatory drug tests of private employees.
2. There are good reasons to support mandatory drug tests of private employees.
3. The reasons for opposing mandatory drug
test are stronger than the reasons for
supporting drug tests.
4. Employees should be required to take
regular on-the-job drug tests.
5. An employee's private drug habits are
NOT the business of the employer.
6.
Drugs .are so dangerous that the company's
right to a safe and drug-free enviroruaent
outweighs the rights of the employee.
7. Drug tests provide an accurate way to see
if employees are taking illegal drugs.
8.
Drug tests provide ethical ways to see if
employees are taking illegal drugs.
9.
Drug tests provide a good way to prevent
drug abuse in the work place.
10. There ought to be a law that protects
employees from mandatory drug tests.
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THERE ARE 13 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE

YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MANDATORY, ON-THE-JOB DRUG TESTING.
FOR EACH OF
TlfESE 13 PAIRS, PLACE AH •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS HOW YOU
FEEL ABOUT DRUG TESTING.
MANDATORY DRUG TESTING rs ...
1.

Good

2.
3.
4.
5.

Valuable
Important
Helpful
Needed
6.
Fair
7. Unethical
8.
Inhwaane
9.
Cruel
10 Misguided
11. Foolish
12. A Problem
13. HURTS A
COMPAJIY
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Bad
Worthless
Unimportant
Harmful
Not Needed
Unfair
Ethical
Hwaane
Merciful
Well Thought out
Wise
An Answer
HELPS A
COMPAJIY

APPENDIX C:
COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL EDITORIALS

Editorial Supporting Active Euthanasia

IHlSE LIFE IS IT, ANYWAY?

A recent medical article
made plblic an ethical dilenna
faced bi/ more and DJre doctore ·
and their patients. '!he
dilama inYolved active euthan•ia or the merciful killing

of a terminally ill patient bi/
In the article, a
cancer patient asked her ~
doctor to help her "end it,
now," to atq> her endless pain
and hopeless suffering with a
deadly injectim. 'lhe physician agreed and the. patient
died within mimtes.
Should doctors actively
participate in euthanasia?
Shculd Ne allow doctora and
patients to plan and carry out
mercy killings? Al thoogh
active euthanasia is widely
pw:ticed in Hollan!, the
Allerican Medical Aaeociatim
(Na) and - t of 1ts lll!!llbers
stard fimly against phyaician-isted euthanasia.
ait lll.1f.PJl"t tor active
eutlwaaia is just as atrcmg.
'Iha federal courts, loerican
Bar Ael9oc1atim, and both.1rde of the plblic feel the
t i . hM o::ae for active
euthanasia.
'!he natim'a legal cxmmnity hM recently decided that
patients taYe the right to
control their lives and their
deaths. In the past, the AK\
Ima OYerlookad the rights of
their patients, and c.lallrled
that a doctor's decisiai to
laeep patients alive - and
-=aetims in pa.in - outweigh
patients' rights to control
their lives. Fortunately,
federal c:ourts have recently
ruled that the rights and
wishes of dying patients
outweigh the decisions of the
medical profesaim.
'Iha natiai '• i.. mkm'a
va new fom!ng atrict rul•
her doctor.
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to control the uae of active
eutmnaaia. With strict legal
controls, active euthanasia
will be very different ttan
either suicide or llll'del'. A
patient's request to die can
c:rlly be granted Nlll!ll the
patient is psychologically
cxnpetent; llllell t'NO qualified
doctors agree the patient will
die within six 1a1tha: and
Nlien thoae doctors agree to
help the patient die. 'lhe
patient's wish is the critical
factor. Paaily, doctors. and
priests can advise the patient,
but the patient . . t Mira the
ultimte decisiai. And.
that'• the May it ehould be.
Patient ehculd be in control
of their final days.
lwn WlY doctors DCM
recognize the need for active
euthanasia. More and m ,
ecience is deuelq>ing the
tedn>lcgy to prolong life
beycnS

our wildest

~.

Bc:N!vel', the ~ of technology haw becale the nightmares of patients and their
tailiee. Mlllc:h1ne8 9llt'f prolcmg
life, brt often it is a life
of unrelenting pain and .uttering. W1 th all the best inten-

tim, the medical profeaeim
hM created a e1ttatial that
it . . t now deal with.
A9 tec:mology grcae, the
call for active eutmnaaia
prcbably grow.

TNo-thirda of

the plblic already 9'ffXJl ta
active euthanasia t.aa:we ·they
are afraid that rather than
die naturally they are going
to be kept alive bi/ Nellmeaning physicians to the
point tobere they are no lcmger
in control of their a1nde or
bodies. 1h1s fear is real.
More ttan 10,000 patients in
this country are m.intained in
a perJlllUll!llt vegetative state
at a yearly c:cat of $12S,OOO
eecll. Ill llw Jn
~

111.,.
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patients aistruat the mtiw
~ order ~
aive, and hcpel- lif~
system, and then aern the
bill to the patient'• f-.tly.
Trust in Mdicine can be
restored if doctors help
patients with difficult decisicns, rather t:i.n ignore

ot physic.imw

their final wishes.
Dealing with death will
not be easy for doctors, and
mny doctors will eay "Me've
never been in the tudnees of
killing• II To that - 981:
reply that "you've never been
in the busineaa of prolcmging
suffering, either." A doctor'•
buaineaa is to help patients.
At time, the beet my and
cnly i . - tay to help •
dying patient is to help that
patient die.
Active euthamsia cm
also help the sur.riwrs, the
fmily
hits ~ suffer with
emecoe '• tenWal il.lmm. A
Los Angel• mn shared his
suffering with - · 1hree
~ ago his
~ld wife
dying of cancer. Ber
pain, be recalls. .._ tz
d~ and the k1dls and I tere
hcpeleee. Nit diacuss !~ ti1at
to do if the pain becme
unbearable and • didn't cxme
to any o::inclusiCDI. Birt, if
llhe lm Mlmd - to help her
die, I . . t certainly tOlld
have helped. I N:JU.ld have
dcne anything, regard}- of
the oonaequences. And the
oonaequences Nel'I!, of c::ourae,
that I would have been gu.11 ty
at the very least of aiding
am abetting a suicide, if not
Nn"Se.
~ f-.ily's suffering
N:JU.ld tave reec:hed a new low."
Ne umerstan:! the wllM8l'ling .:rtive of thcae tG>
CRXl89 active euthanasia, but
patients and their fail1•
ehculd not be forced to suffer.

•1
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Editorial Opposing Active Euthanasia

HEVER GIVE UP af YtxJR PATIENTS

A recent medical article
mde public an ethical dill!lllDIS
faced by more and D:lre doctors
ard their patients. '1'he

healin;J can be wi thdracl.
But. the AMl Aid the
hand of healin;J can neuer be
replac:ed with the hand of
death. Ro •tter tiihat the
request, a doctor a.t never

dilemma involved active euthanasia or the merciful killin;J
of a te.nainally ill patient by
her doctor. In the article, a
cancer patient asked her young
doctor to "end it, now," to

intentionally cause a patient·
to die. 'ftlat 1e •imply not a
doctor's role. '1'here ia a
Mn"ld of difference betueen not
treat1ng aaneooe tft:> tents no

stq> her pain and suffer1ng

deliberately eming the life a
patimt tft:> Nants to die.

with a deadly injection. Ber
doctor agI eed and the patient
d,ied within ainutee.
Should doctors actively
participate in euthanasia?
Shoo.lei gouennenta and hoepi ta.la allow patients and
doctors to plan and cany out
'1'he young
physician and thoae tft:> llUppOrt

Dl!rC'f killings?

active euthanasia obviCQSly
feel that a patient has the
right to die and endure no
lllOl'e pain.
Purther, aupportera
claia that death 1a often the
only merciful re&9pCl8! and

treablent' and physically and
1heee tMD Nll'lda ahollld neuer

be cmtused.
1h1e does not mMll that
doctors ehould etan:I by mt
Natch patients suffer. As
lllCh - doctore ehould prewmt
death, they ehculd also prevent
suffering. Dr. Stewn Mil•,
a mted ethical specialist frca
the tbiverai ty of adcago says
that pain CCl'ltrolling drugs
are tao oftm owrrlooklld
during motional t1-.
tbSenl drugs are new ao good

that patients can literally

that a physician ab:Ju.ld zespet.."1:
a patient'• desperate wish to

sleep through their pain.
Miles eays that CCl'ltrollin;J

die.

pain in tenlinally ill patients
1e no prcblea: the probl• 1e
•one ot physician ignm•ance. •
8ecaUl9e mny physiciml8 do not
knew hew to CCl'ltrol pain, they
NIUlgly beliew that pain

'1'he argments for active
euthanasia, haire..'9r, aourx!
better the 1 - they are
exaained. 11'*1 the Amric:an
·Medical Association (AMl)
clceely exaa1ned active euthanasia it found saDe fatal

flae.
Doctors take an oath to
heal and a vow to respect the
wishes of their patients. It
the patient wishes to take no
medication, a doctor aJSt
Iespect that wish. If a
patient does not tent to be
kept alive by respirators and
intravenous feeding', the choice
of the patient BJSt prevail.
Doctors can never legally or
mlly treat a patient tft:>
toants no treatment. If the
patient asks, the hand of

camot be CCl'ltrolled. 'ftlrough
ignorance, they see euthanasia
as the only tey out. '1'h1e 1e
a deadly aistake that can be

avoided if active eutlmlasia 1e
banned.
Allowing active euthanasia
is likely to op!!l'l a Pandora's
Bax of trooblee that Ne my
never be able to clOBe.
First, there are legal trcAlb-les. Jlw.t will be the legal
c:oosequences of doctors tft:>
agree to help a peracm die?
Will the doctor be an accaaplic:e in a crime? lbat if the
diagnosis ~ and the
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patient CXJU.ld have really
surviwd? Ia the doc:tar
respcx•ible for a wroogful
death?
Next, there are psychological problem. Ewrl it a
doctor facee no legal prcbl-.
lcnalfingly injecting a patient
with a lethal doae is bound to
came stress amcmg already
CMtr-Stresseti doctors. Not
all doctors will sulter, but
mny will.
Pina.Uy, there are aocial
problem. If active euthanasia
is allared, it is safe to
- - that many desperate
patients will aalc to die. In
tlm, llCtiw eutt.maia my
becme the nora. It that eYm'
hllA*• - my KN'9 fral ml
·~ that recagn.1.w the
right to die to a dartc climate
Jn *ich • patient feels the
abl.lgaticlft Cll' mty to die. If
that w
bappem, actiw
eut:hmaeia will c::auae m
.uttering that it could eYe?'

cure.

--·tor

'lb!re are no sillple

the problra1aed in Mdicine. 'Dll9
probl• of actiw euthanasia
1a no different. sw.i ~
Jnmt religioue echolarll
c:U.agree CMm" the m l i ty ot
euthanasia. !i:JNevmo, until
there is abeolutely no debate
CJVlel' eutlwlasia, phymiciana
- - 8tay ~ fral helpiDJ
patients die.
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Editorial Supporting Marriage for Priests

A debate is rising !!I!!!!!
in the Catholic OlUrcb aboUt
the priesthood. '1'he debate is
rising because the m:aber of
young men entering aeminariee
is drcwlng, the JUllber of
priests is shrinking, and • a
result the quality of pastoral
eervice is tested • too few
men are spread tao tar.
1'lere are, no doubt mny ·
cauaea far these probl-. ~
cause is the aurc:h'• stand cm
mrriage for prieeta. Dcubte
about marriage in the priesthocd are not new. b ' centuries theolog1- haw argued
that requiring yamg men to
refuae wivea and taailiee in
amvice ot God my pm ..iy
devtJut men - - t fraa the .
amvice of God.
'DUa~ is not
w1 thart its critics. ~

tilO ~ clerical .arriagee
argue that the ec::ripturm
prewnt it, the t:rad1 tlcms of
the Omrch ~ it' and that
it will interfere with the
bcn1 betueen a priest and his

pariah.
li:INl!Yer, mrriage for
catholics does baYe .upp:rt in

the ecripturea: it does have a
long t:raditicm in the Omrch:
am it is a eemible t8'f to
1llp'CYe the Qm'Ch and 1lllpl'CM9
the bcn1 between a priest and

hie pariah.
'1'he evidence.
• MARRIAG! AND 'l1IB APOS'lt.lS
Miily Catholics beliew that
the Apostles never mrried and

that their celibacy eet a
p1oecedi!nt far an umarried
priesthood. 'Dl1s is not the
c=-. Sane ap:ietlee Mere

mrried, others Mere not.
J'Urthenllore, one ot the celibata 11pC19tlee, Paul in the
l'Jrst Corin~ 7:2, deferded

mrriagee at large Nlll!!ll stating
that 11each mil ehculd baYe h1a
CJlCl w1 fe and each t«llell her
OlCl blabend."
It is bud to
reccnc:ile celibate Paul'•
eupport of marriage w1 th the
Omrch'• current doctrine of
an umarried priesthood.
• MARRIAGE AND PRIISTS.
Mmy Catholic:e also believe

that t!lllt Catholic aurc:h baa
newr allOMed priests to
mny. Rot eo. To the eurprae of mirf'f. the aurc:h
allCINl!d clerical mrriagee for
CNer 1000 years!
'!he •jority
of priesta Mere mrried mtil
1139 .nm the C2mrc:b dmlged
i ta policy' farbidd1ftJ prieste
the rights to marry that
are offered to pariahicnmw.
"1y the change in 11397
surprisingly' the ct.nge not for ecriptural reu rm.
Rather' the t:rad1 tJm dmlged
to - - the <hJ1"Ch fit the
epiri tual needs ot the day.
In 1139 influential catholics
believed that p:IY81"ty and
•lf-suft'erlng .... aymb:>la ot
deYoticn, and no acts aymb:>l1.zed dewtim m
thm c:elJl:ecy and ieolaticn fraa mrriage. Catholics, in 1139,
d
nded that priests not
.any. '1he <hJ1"Ch m. follOMed
that wish for CN9l" 800 years.
art today mrJV Catholica
and priesta are asking the
ChJrCh to c:hmge again and to
mke celibacy and mrriage an
opticm rather than a requirement. N1Y'1 1'lere are be>

reae ce•.
'1'he first is Jmelicate
but . . t be raised. Parced
celibacy leads .any priests
into eexml •inl lilm Glltery.
Ro mn should be require:! to
bec:cme celibate if he does not
have the strength for it. If
farced, he 'llllfl struggle in
vain, and he 'llllfl ec:armlize
the dmrc:h. Celibacy an!
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marriage - t both be optiarw
for prieet8. not requ..irementa.
Seccni, marriage 1n the
priesth:Xld gets support frc:a
the w1adcm ot Paul tilho ( 1n
T1-rthy 3:1-12) encouraged
priests to mny Nll!n he noted
that •tor it a mn does not
knew hew to mnage his CNl

hcuaehold, hew can he care tor

God's house?" A priest tilho
c:mi experience the laue and
probleaa of a f.Uly can

better care for God's hcuse.
A priest ~ can mrry can
9tarx! with his parJah.imera
and their failies rather ttmn
9tarx! isolated frc:a thm.
It the amrch updates ita
Nlee an IBl'l'iage and alloe a

priest to c::hocae bebleen
mrr!age and celibacy - an
option that 1a offered to all
other catholics -

thm the

prieetb:xx! will becale m
~!ng to ~ catholim
and the Omrch will be tree to
reep:ind to the spiritual needs

ot our age rather

than the
Olrtdated needs ot C8ltur1•

i:-t·
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• BIBLICAL '1'BACHDIB •

A debate is rising in the
catholic churdl atxiut the
priesthood. '1be detete is
rising because the maber of
young llll!!n enterinJ 9ellinaries

c!roR>ing.

the nmber of
priests has been shr1nking,
and as a result the quality of
pastoral service has been
Mel8la!ned as too few llll!!n are
spreed too far.
Sane people believe that
the <2Jurc::h' a stand en arriage
for priests is the cause of
the problem. 'Dll!"f argue that

is

requiring young men to aac:rific:e marriage and t'-.ily in
eeivice of God my pl8h mny
devart

181 ~

frca the

priesthood. To eolw th1a
problea acae people are asking
that priests be allaed to
mrry. Allc:Ming priests to
mrry, 90 the arg\m!!nt gees.
will refill the -.inaries
with mell de"Joted to do God I 8
tCldc, and will rej\M!nate the

First, Olriat mde it clear
that the Apostles should not
divide their devotim. At the
Last 9'lfP!%'. Christ told the
Apostles, "Cale follow Me!
Leave all th1J99, and everycne
N10 has left h:Jase, or brother,
or sister, or father, or
.:>ther, or wife, or children
for My sake shall receive a
Blndredfold.• Pollc:Ming Ilia
CXlllDiUld, priests have alttay8
been the

5

!llgll!l"S and ~

eentatiwa of God. Par centuries, thoee N10 have apread
God'. Jbrda have aleo lived "'
nioee Jbrda.

Tena of thoosard9

of priests, a:rir:s and mm
have mrried the Qmrch and no
aw elae. .1cm the Baptist,
Peter and Paul sacrificed
marriage tar God. In tact,
all the Apostles, except aw,
aac:rif iced mrriage in devoticn
to God. 'Die ally Apostle to
IBl"l'Y tel9 Judas.
• PAR'l'-TDBPRIES'.
---1-~

•

Being a priest _ . . being

Qmrch.

first, last, and al.yB

'ftl1s ~t. haiill!Yer,
i . . acae probl-. To begin
with, it is too easy to p>int
to the shrinking -.lnaries
md cax:l\Xle that the prcbl•

1~ !

c::c- from the Qmoch and the
edicts ca mrriage. In fact,
much of the decline in aminary
enrol1-nts ~ sillply
because the "Baby Bom" generation has graci up. With fewer
ycung men around today, there
are fewer young men to enter
the seminaries this year. A
new ruling ca mrriage in the
priesth::iod will not change
this situaticn, and will not
refill the seminaries.
Even if mrriage in the
priesth::iod could inc: HH the
IUlber of priests, the Omrch
llh:Wd not change 1ts historical p:ieitian. 'ftw 1 IMCl18
are ma/·

e E!llti Uva of God

a

~

8er'.ll!S all people, and aer..wa
all people equally. It is
hard to deny that the d
1:ds
of a wife and haily tD1ld

interfere with a priest:'•
ability to aerw his pariah.
In tact, it be is to be a good
blsmnd and parent, the dellard9

of his f..Uly should interfere
with his NJl'k. In the em,
the 01urch and ~

NJUld suffer traa the parttime priesth::iod.
• LCH'.RDl3 mg STANllAmlS

•

If catholic parishicners
t:Iu!ly Nlllted priests to be
like a.1n.isters in other fai thll,
catholics NJUld let it be
lax:Ml. ait ll08t catholics are
silent about marriage for
priests because they "'8llt and
mcpect m
traa their prt..t.8.
catholica . n t a prieet: to be
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9aDe00e

special

eamecne they
Nx> by his
guides and inspires

can trust
~le

I

I

9CJlleCl'le

them.

N:luld the ex;aaples aet by
married priests inspire Catholics? tl'lfortunately not. A
married priest t«:IUld be a
leader Nx> announces that he
c::anrX>t devote himelf to God,
that he 1a ally pa..-tia.lly

coamitted to his special job.
It Ne allow priests to aarry,
Ne -v get lllOl'e priests, but
Ne will also get priests Nx>
are less devoted. J'Ust • the
airl.inee and hosp! ta1 toDJ.ld not
lower their standards to
attract lllOl'e pilots and doctors, the ChJrch cannot laer
its starmrds to attract more
priests.
11le 01ui-ch and its followers have very little to
gain and very mlCh to looae if

priests are allowlld to mrry.
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Salle recent l"\lllblings out of
Sprirqfield are can1ng traa
educatic:n experts ""1o Mint
reform at the State Higher
!ducatic:n Board, the office

that mk:es policy far Illinois'
13 publicly fumed universi ties. Al tlx:Jugh few agree en
how to solve the problems or
tohlc:h problems are B:JSt blportant, experts and interested
spectators have Dlldl to say

ab:Jut the public universities.
Por instance, critics say that

the budget for state univerai ties is either too high or
not high tn:JUgh. Experts say
the dearw and presidents haw
either too mch power or not
enough pcwer.

Tax

~

say

that too mrrt c::ioorses are
offered or not enough are
offered.
'ftlrough this noise 11111!
heard a CX111plaint that caught
our attentic:n. Por a'1f!!r a
century the State Higher
Bducatien Board had a aiasien - to provide high quality and
lCN c:oat educ:atien to the
people of Illinois. lhe Beard
shcAlld be comer:ded for their
efforts. Illinois universities are amaig the beat in the
natioo and provide a first
class educatien for Illinois
residents. Our state universities have also made higher
educatien affordable. Even
tlx:Jugh students and their
t-..ilies usually save and
borrow to pay for college, tax
S\lR)Ort t'rca all Illinois
residents helps keep the coat
dacl.

the State !ducatioo
failed is in i ta
adnissioos policy. OOOer the
current "selective admissiaw"
policy, acceptance into a
state lmiversity is based en
~

Bee.rd has

blO criteria: a high school
diplaa. and the potential for
success in college. "Potential" is usually based on
success or failure in the
past. Qtly N'len high ech:x>l
grades and stan:Sard test scores
are abo'Je sane a1n1- will
the doors to the state universities open. M.:lat of Illinois'
high school students easily
meet the lllin1lua standards,
bit acme do not. OOOer selective aiiaissicns, acceptance
into Illinois universities
remains a privilege that not
all Illinois residents share.
Now the trad1 tioo ot
selective a:Dissicns into
state fumed universitiea is
being challenged bo/ Ma/
educ:atien experts 1n Spr~
field. 'ftle'y reo::men:! that
the Board replace the selective
ain1ssien policy with an •open
achissicns" pllicy. tJrD!r open
achissicns, past grades and
teat ecore wru.1d be ignored.
Acceptance into Illinois'
state universities wculd
require c:nly a high ech:x>l
diplaa and the desire to
leam.
1he challenges to selective a:kiasions are sillple. A
university that is blilt and
mainta..1.ned w1 th public rrll!!'f
shcAlld be open to the plblic.
Each persc:n's tax dollars help
su;p:::irt the schools.

return for this tax

In
~.

ea.ch persc:n shcAlld have tbe
right to atterd. By closing
the doors of the university we
do blO th1rgs. We deny people
the right to use SC111ething that
they help pay for. Arn, we
send a r s ; "911! to people that
tohlle their 1ltCDI!!!'/ is good
enough to go to the universi ties, they are not.

Selective adlllissicns is
alao challenged becauae it'• an
lmfair blrdm on lClf 1ncme
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ta.ilies. Tax payere traa all
1nocae levels - high, aiddle,
and low - help 8\JAXll'"t the
state schools. !kit, st\Dents
traa the low 1nccme families
are 8'hitted into state sch:lols
tar less often, usually because
they came traa the N:ll"Bt
plblic high echools and suffered the lowest test scores.
Ne believe that the education
system that failed thell in the
past should not igoore their
dreeas to enter college in the
future. With private un.1versit1• rema.1n1ng too expemive,
the plblicly fumed miversit1ea are tho a'lly }qie for
law 1noome students.
cpn.1ng the cblre to all
high 8Chool graduates does not
mearl that unqualified students
will remain enrolled tilmi they
are failing. 1he door that
ea. the NlY into the un.1versi ty - t be uaed with a door
that shae the .ay out. llo
one benefits fraa clasm:'OC.JIS
that are ouercrowded, faculty
that are OYenl:lrla!d, ..S
cl.aamlte that slow the pace
of l8Ei119Cn11.
there will be growing
pains with open ada1•ims,
bit with prqm" control m'ld an
out door that 9ldnga as easily
as an in door, the paiDI will
be replaces w1 th gains. 1ht
issue of open ai:in.iasiaw is an

emot1ooal aie. Its foes
believe in their hearts that
educaticn will suffer if
ewryale is offered it.
Its
friends, however, believe that
w1 th educatim, like heal th,
ewryale

has it.

benefits if

~
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OSIH3 'nm STATE UNIVERSITIES
WISELY

Sale recent rumblings out ot
Springfield are o::aing from
education experts NX> tent
refona at the State Higher
l!'ducation Board, the office
that mla!s p::>licy for Illinois'
13 plblicly fumed universi ties. Al thcagh few agree a i
hDf to solve the problems or
lllhich problems are ll:l9t lllport-

ant. experta and interested
spectators have DlCh to eay
abJut the plblic universities.
Par imt.anoe, critics _., that
the bldget for state universi ties is either too high or
not high enough. Experts .ay
the deans and presidents hive
either too mxh pc::N!l' or net
eroa;h power. Tax pa~ say
that too l8f'I'f courses are
ottered or not enoogh are
offered.
1hroogh th.is noise •
heard a cc:ap.laint that caught
cur attentiai. Par CNe1" a
oentmy the State Higher
Pducaticn Board had a aiesicn - to provide high quality and
lCllf ccat educaticn to the
people of Illinois. 'ftlf! Board
eb:Juld be caaasded for their
efforts. Illinois universities are aaaig the best in the
natioo and provide a first
c1- educaticn for Illinois
rmidents. OUr state univer•ities have also mde higher
eclJcaticn affordable. Everl
thcugh st'ldents and their
families usually save and
borrow to pay for college, tax
sqiport traa all Illinois
residents helps keep the coat
dacl.
Same experts are ~inJ,
haever, that the State Higher
Fducation Board has failed an
illportant part of this aissim.
'ftlf! ccaplaint centers on the
Board's adaiasicns p::>Ucy.

Under the current "selective
achissicns" p::>licy. acceptance
into a state university is
based on blo criteria: a high
sc:b:X>l dipl.cma. and the p::>tential for sucoeea in college.
"Potential" for college is
usually baaed en a history of
past succeee in high ec:bool.
high echcol grades and
standard test acares are alxJvie

~

sane llUniam, the doors to the
state universities open. Nll!!!l
high sc:b:X>l grades and tests
scores are lCllf. the doors to
state universities remain
Closed. M:8t of IllinoJa I
high school stlm!nts - i l y
meet the • j n f • • 8tandards,
bit sane do not. thiel' eelee-

tive ada.iasicns, acxq;>tar.oe
into Illinois universities
1"'elDaJne a privilege that
Illinois residents need to
eam.
!bf the trad..iticn of
selective adaiasia. into
state furded universities is
being challeriged b1J a few
educaticn exp:rt:a. ~
rec:oamen:! that the Board
replace the selective adm1ssicn
p::>licy with an "open adl.1.ssicns" policy. O'der open
ada.iasicns, ~ grades and
test 9C01"e NCul.d be ignored.
Accepta11ce into Illinois 1
state 9Chools tclUld require
a'lly the wish to atterxl, bit
net the history of success or
the p::>tential to graduate.
Supporters of open a&U.ss icns reason that taxpayers
have earned the right to a
college education b1J blilding
and maintaining state universi ties with their tax dollars.
Since their tax dollars help
pay for it, they sb:Wd get to
use it. True, bit a'lly to a
p::>int.
the same lcgic.
paying ta>Cl!!!8 to the federal
govennent \olCUld entitle the
1llelll thy to get food st.p. and

av
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MCU.ld entitle average ci ti.ze!w
adventures a\ the space smtue. Tax dollars do not give

m carte bl.anche to all state

service.
At 9C1m! p:>int, the state
has to be realistic. 'Ihe
state can afford - tut just

barely -

to educate all of
its residents through high
school. 'Ihe cost of a college
educ:aticn is ao high and 1n
such short SUR>lY that the
state 111.lSt use its colleges

wisely.
Open aa.issiaw .1e a ...ell
inten:Sed. tut UBd.ae use of
public universities. 'Ihe
direct resu.l t of open adlll.1ssia'1119 MCUld be owrcrc:Jtded
clwrocms an:S OYen«Jtbd
tacul ty. 'Ihe best students
MCUld f .1m OOUl'9e8 unchallenging and uninspiring because
lectures NJUJ.d be elCMed dcNl
bl/ or brought dcNl to leas
able stuient:a. In all likelihood, open adlrlasiaw MOUld
Ml!!8bn the univeraitl•. If
the state Higher !duc:aticz
Beard Wl!llnts to sooceed 1n the
aiasicn of prov1d1ng high
qm..11 ty. low cost e:!uc:atiCX\ to ·
the peq>le of Illinoie, it
should stay with the &elective
.,_1asiaw p:>licy that mde
Illinois' 13 state universities
~ the best 1n the ocuntry.
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tllil!!ll the (X'lllD1•icners Of
both the National Baseball
League and the Rational Pootba.11 League first annoonced

that all players . . t regularly
un1ergo mamatory tests to
detect illegal drug use. mny
players - and llW:lBt private
eq;>layees - Ne1"e caught

without a solid legal defense
and with few good argtm!llta.
A federal coort told
players and ~t
ellplayees they da\ It have the
legal defenses of the cxnatitution that protect our privacy
frail unreasc:mble eearch aid
seizure "bof the gouerTlll!l'lt."
But. Nlell private c:ampaniee
are do1ng the.searc:hing,
emiplayees do not have the
ccnsti tution m their te..
At pz e 11 mt. ClClll:eJUe8 are
w1nn.ing the CO'ltest CNer
mndatory drug tests, especially far jobs that imiolw
the safety of other people.
"n"9 court rulinga do not just
awly to c::M!i-deYeloped football players. Par instance.
the courts have 1ncltded truck
drivers. CXOJt:Nctim N01icera.
factory NtJrkoeH. and others as
open for drug testing.
'l1le silence of the o:msti tution takes ~ the mjor
defenge of private Nll"kers.

niere are other reascns.
to favor drug test1ng.
In fact. we think the case for

~.

mardatcrt tests in safetysensitive jobs is strmg.
O(p:ine!lts of mrdatory tests
Eke sane argunents that
s~ly den' t stand up.
cwerients argue that drug
tests are not accurate aid that
Err/ inoocent people will be
falsely accused of drug use.
After all • JD.istalces do higlen.
lltlle this fear had aome

grcund.1ng in the past. it has
little grounding today.
Recently the federal courts
began rul1ng that c:aipn.1es
must use drug tests with great
care. Great care 1nclu:tea

using a aeccnd, lllOl'e accurate
test for anyooe that test
positive for drug use. If the

eq>layee does not test positive
a'l the aeccnd test. he 1.e in
the clear. If a secx::n! test
is not used the ccapmy can
expect to be dragged to coort
by employees and can expect to
loose. By ensuring that no
peq>le are wraigly acc'lsed of·
drug use, the a1"'gl.mlE!nt aboot
test accuracy is Dl1"I! fear ·

than fact.
l!'.lllplayees al&o argue that
..roatcrt testing, "'1.ile not
technic:ally illegal. alght to
t:e illegal. Ne disagree. In
fact. te see clear reascn to
beliew that CCllPIJlies are
morally obligated to use
mndatary tests. In the
1930'• the Allerican labor
KM!llll!llt helped the COJntly
recognize that "<lfllY e11player
must m.intain a Nlrkplace free

fraa hazards that are lilmly to
c:auae death and serious injuly.
In the 1980'• Ni! - t recognlle
the hazards of drugs in the

N:>rkplac:e. Statistics frca the
American Medical Associatim
MUn that 1 out of 20 ~
workers has a drug problem.
and 1 of 10 has an alcx::h>l
problem. Many of these P.l"Ob-

leins are left at heme. bit
sane cxae to N:nit. In safety~itive jobs, cme perscn 1 s

drug problem can cost another
persc:&'l his life. If testiJ9
helps identify people tillO are
us1ng dnigs. ar if it helps
prevents employees frall tlying
dnigs. then the caipany DJSt
use test1ng to protect .inrxx::ent
peq>le.
Pina.lly. cg>alll!!lts of
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mndatory testing argue that
our private life is a private
matter and is no business of
our employer. We 1'CJUld agree,
but a\ly if what Ne do at hcme
does not affect Nlilt Me do at
1Cll'k. SID:lk1ng mrijuana on
Sat\n'day should not c:cn:::em
our bosses if it does not
affect us m tblday. Using
ooc:a1ne in the evenir9 is

private if it leaves us clear

a1JDed in the morning.

are big "if•" thJu;h,

'lbese

am with

drug abuse, private life and
NJrk life do overlap. All too
often, drugs at heme bec:me
abaenteeiaa and seriam accidents at tcn1t. ~ayers haw
been forced to learn this
lesscm, and are forced to do
acmeth1ng aboot 1t.
llD CGllpllly reliahee the
idea of regular drug testing.
Testing 1a experlSiYe and
urvip1 J v . But, it a c:mpauy
feels that drug abuse poaea a
seriam and reel threat to
other warb:!lw, tb9 CXlllllpm1y hM
the right - if not the obligation - to take this \V'lpq'' l ar

step. Sc:metilles the public
interest - t Neigh heavier
than private interests. tllerl
it CC9!l8 to pt'Otecting imxx:ent
~le,

CCllpmiee llhculd be

allONed to conduct mndatary
drug testing.
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far each 100 employees. Nice
resul ta. But, N1en the tests
are re--chec:ked b'{ less profit"ill!ll the ccmn.issiooers of
both the Natiaw.l Basetall
League and the Hatiaal Pootl:all League first anromced
that all players 11.lSt regularly
a00ergo mamatory tests to
detect illegal drug use, sany

and most private
Nel'e caught
wi thcut an 1Jllportaa1t legal
defense bit with many valid
complaints.
A federal court told
players ard ncrHJCYe?'.l"lt
C!llployees they don't have the
legal defenses of the cxnrtitutlon that protect our privacy
trc:a unreasooable search and
aeizure "by the gcM!?'DDl!!nt.•
art, ..tlll!!l pri"Arte ~
are do1ng the eearching,
e11ployees do mt haw the
c:awtitution on their tam. At
present, c:capmUee are winUng
the ccntest CJUll!t1" mndatory drug
tests, especially for jobs
that !nYolvie the safety of
other people. 1he court
rulinga do rx>t just apply to
players -

e11ployees -

CM!r'-develqed football playFor instan::e, the c:curts
have incl\D!d tNck drivers,

ers.

cx:nrt:ructim 1llOrlcers, factory
N:l?"lcel:'S, and others as open
terr drug test1ng.
1he silence of the ccnrtitutiai takes~ m.ly ale
defense of private employees.
'l'here are other reascns,

?x:wever. to

!Jl1.

cwcse

In fact'

N!!

drug testth1nlt the

case against mamatory tests
in safety-sens! ti ve jobs is
still very straq because
supporters of mrnatory tests
Eke 9CIDe argunents that silllply
dcn't stand up.
SURx>rters argue that
drug tests are accurate. 1he
Ekers of these tests say
their tests mJce mly 3 errors

oriented scientists the results
are awa.Ilil'qly bad. 1he
An!rican Medical Asaociatim
found that drug tests mJce rx>t
3' but 2!5 aistalcea in 100.
Bad erDJgh being around other
people tolx> are Slldc.1ng marijuana my cause you to test
positive far drug use, these
"state-of-~ tests"
confuse cold medicines w1 th
aqibetaninee, oriental teas
with marijuana, am the PW'/
seeds on ycur bagel with opiaa
and heroine. Twenty-five
a1stakes in 100 Iepl ! a ents 25
people tiiX> aight loaae their
jobs, their futura, and their
repitatic:ma bec:au8e they are
gull ty of nothing m
tmn
worldng for • c:cmpany that
requires drug tests.

Colllpan.ies UB1ng these
tests alao argue that ll!lndatory
testing falls w1 th the boundaries of the law. Ne agree.
'Dle9e tests are tec:hn.1cally
legal , but M9 also feel they
are a gross distartim of the
legal systea. our legal
system leans in hM:ir of

innocence Mll!re 9CIMtiw a
gull ty per8al gees tree to

ensure that innocent people
are never caNicted. DNg
testing leans in the qp:si te
directim and favors gull t -

mny imcx::ent people get fired
to ensure that the few pe6ple
guilty of using drugs are
caught. 'fttls notim of justice, we feel, is hard to
defend.

Finally, defE!llders of
lllSB3atory tests argue that
c:x:apmiea have the right to

protect their CUipiillY. their
employees, and their custanere
fraa drug ab.lSe.

Ro argmeit,

here. Drugs dcn't belcn;1 in
the tclriq>lace. th!!ll drl.1gl!I are
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used, productivity stulbles,
proti ta fall, and insurance
premi1- get as high as the
rrumber of accidents. But,

there are better, 9:lre hnane
to CCl'ltrol drug al:AJl!le
than forcing 1«lrlcel• to provide
urine smples. Sohen dl'UIJll
becale a problem there are
NBy8

clear signs -

regular tardi-

ness, absentee.ism, job impairment, poor c:orduct and ~
tiooal troubles. If a omc:auy
educates aupervi.aors and coHOl'kera alxlut theae signs
there 1s no need for expensive
am inaccurate tests. Drug
abl&e 1s a probl• that .1a

best sp:>tted am treated ~
people. not ~ test t'ubes and
.labratcry b!&ts.
Cb! issue Ne feel that
cxmpan.1es too often try to

a1niaJ.3e is aft ellp}ayee I 8
privacy. Just because the
ocnrti tutiai does not preYent
CQl" boaeea trca erxx::ipinlJ into

private lives doesn't . . i i
that thley ah:Wd be anoq>ing.
If - and this 1a a big •if• - ,,._t Ne do at tale has no
effect ai "'8t • do at lll:lrit,
it should be toespected private. If te decide to '8e
marijuana cm Saturmy night 11e
8hculd anaer to the police,
not to our bosses. It 1a rxne
CQl"

of their t:usinem, and artside
of their righta. fotlndatcry
drug testing ooght to be bamed.

APPENDIX D:
PERSONALITY SCALES USED IN THE STUDY

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
MCSD

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes
and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true
or false as it pertains to you personally. Then circle "T" if the
statement is true for you, and "F" if the statement if false for you.
l)

T

F

Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.

2)

T

F

I never hesitate to go out of may way to help
someone in trouble.

3)

T

F

It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work
if I am not encouraged.

4)

·T

F

I have never intensely disliked anyone.

5)

T

F

On occasion I have doubts about my ability to
succeed in life.

6)

T

F

I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

7)

T

F

I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8)

T

F

My table manners at home are as good as when I eat
out in a restaurant.

( 9)

T

F

If I could get into a movie without paying and be
sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.

(10)

T

F

On a few occasions, I have given up doing something
because I thought too little of my ability.

(11)

T

F

I like to gossip at times.

(12)

T

F

There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew they
were right.

(13)

T

F

No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good
listener.

(14)

T

F

I can remember "playing sick" to get out of
something.

(15)

T

F

There have been occasions when I took advantage of
someone.

(16)

T

F

I'm always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.

(17)

T

F

I always try to practice what I preach.
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( 18)

T

F

I don't find it particularly difficult to get along
with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.

(19)

T

F

I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive
and forget.

(20)

T

F

When I don't know something, I don't at all mind
admitting it.

(21)

T

F

I am always courteous, even to people who are
disagreeable.

(22)

T

F

At times I have really insisted on having things my
own way.

(23)

T

F

There have been occasions when I felt like smashing
things.

(24)

T

F

I

(25)

T

F

I

(26)

T

F

I have never been irked when people expressed ideas
very different from my own.

(27)

T

F

I never make a long trip without checking the
safety of my car.

(28)

T

F

There have been times when I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others.

(29)

T

F

I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone
off.

(30)

T

F

I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors
of me.

(31)

T

F

I have never felt that I was punished without
cause.

( 3 2)

T

F

I sometimes think when people have a misfortune
they only got what they deserved.

(33)

T

F

I have never deliberately said something that hurt
someone's feelings.

would never think of letting someone else be
punished for my wrongdoings.
never resent being asked to return a favor.
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Feelings of Inadequacy Scale
FII

Please answer each of the following questions by circling the
answer that best describes you.

=================================================================
1.

How often do you have the feeling
that there is nothing you can do
well?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

2.

When
of a
your
feel

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

3.

How often do you worry about
whether other people like to
be with you?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
5=Practically Never

4.

How often do you feel selfconscious?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

5.

How often are you troubled with
shyness?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
5=Practically Never

6.

How often do you feel that you
handle yourself well at social
gatherings?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Nev~r

7.

How often do you have the feeling that you can do everything
well?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

8.

When you talk in front of a
class or group of people your
own age, how often are you
pleased with your performance?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

you have to talk in front
class or group of people
own age, how often do you
afraid or worried.
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9.

How often do you feel comfortable when starting a conversation with people who you don't
know?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

10. How often do you feel that you
are a successful person?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

11. How often do you feel inferior
to most of the people you know?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

12. How often have you felt that
you are a worthless individual?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

13. How much do you worry about how
well you get along with other
people?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

14. How often have you felt that
you dislike yourself?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

15. How often have you felt so
discouraged with yourself that
you wondered whether anything
is worthwhile?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

16. How often do you feel that you
are a success at the things
that you do?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

17. How often have you felt that
you will be a success in your
future job or career?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
J=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never
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18. How often have you felt sure of
yourself when among strangers?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

19. How often do you feel that some
day people you know will look
up to you and respect you?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never

20. In general, how often have you
felt confident in your abilities?

l=Very Often
2=Fairly Often
3=Sometimes
4=0nce in a Great While
S=Practically Never
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Speilberger Trait Anxiety Scale
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAJF-Y·I

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then
blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do
noc spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer
which seems to describe how you generally feel.
21. I feel pleasant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

©

22. I feel nervous and restless

<D

25. I feel satisfied with myself

<D

@

24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

<D

@

())

©

25. I feel like a failure

.. ...... ........ ............ .. .... ........ .

<D

@

@

©

.. . ... .. .... ..................... ..... .. ........ .

<D

@

@

©

<D

@

@

©

28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them

<D

@

@

©

29. I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter . . . . . .

<D

@

@

©

50. I am happy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

<D

@

@

©

51. I have disturb.ing though1s .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

<D

@

@

@

52. I lack self-confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

<D

@

<D

©

55. I feel secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

<D

@

@

©

54. I make decisions easily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

<D

@

@

©

55. 1 feel inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

©

@

@

©

'6. I am content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

©

@

@

©

57. Some unimportant 1hought runs through my mind and bothers me

©

@

@

©

<D

@

@

@

<D

@

@

©

<D

@

@

©

26. I feel rested

27. I am "calm, cool, and collected"

........ ..... ..... .. ......... ..

@

@

©
©

©

58. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my
mind ...................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
59. I am a steady person

............................ ·'· . . . . . . . . . . .

40. I ge1 in a s1a1e of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns
and imerests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Need-For-Cognition Scale
NFC
We would like you to read the following statements and then
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree each. There are no
"correct" responses to these statements, only those responses that
best describe you and your personal feelings.
You can indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each
statement by using the following scale. Please circle the one
number that best describes you and your personal feelings.
-4

Very Strong Disagreement
Disagreement
Moderate Disagreement
-1
Slight Disagreement
o = Neither Disagreement or Agreement
+1
Slight Agreement
+2
Moderate Agreement
+3 = strong Agreement
+4
Very Strong Agreement
-3
-2

= Strong

==================================================================
1) I really enjoy a task that
-4 -3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 +3 +4
involves coming up with new
solutions to problems.

2) Learning new ways to think

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +l +2 +3 +4

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

6) I like tasks that require little
thought once I've learned them.

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

7) I prefer to think about small,
daily projects to long-term ones.

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

8) I would rather do something that
requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge
my thinking abilities.

-4 -3 -2 -1

o

9) I find little satisfaction in
deliberating hard and for long
hours.

-4 -3 -2 -1

O +1 +2 +3 +4

doesn't excite me very much.
3) The idea of relying on thought

to make my way to the top does
not appeal to me.
4) The idea of thinking abstractly

is not appealing to me.

·

5) I only think as hard as I have

to.

+1 +2 +3 +4
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=================================================================

= Very Strong Disagreement
= Strong Disagreement
= Moderate Disagreement
Slight Disagreement
-1
0 = Neither Disagreement or Agreement
+l = Slight Agreement
+2 = Moderate Agreement
+3 = Strong Agreement
+4 = Very Strong Agreement
==================================================================
-4
-3
-2

10) I don't like to have the responsibility of handling a situation
that requires a lot of thinking.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

11) I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task
that required a lot of mental
effort.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

12) Thinking is not my idea of fun.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

13) I try to anticipate and avoid
situations where there is a
likely chance I will have to
think about something in depth.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

14) I prefer my life to be filled
with puzzles that I must solve.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

15) I would prefer complex to simple
problems.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

16) It's enough for me that something gets the job done, I don't
care how or why it works.

-4 -3 -2 -1

0 +l +2 +3 +4

APPENDIX E:
PAPER-AND-PENCIL
MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY

P-Scale

No doubt, there are many times in a day that people try to
convince you of something. People you live with may suggest that a
relative is dishonest because of something he or she did. After
seeing a movie together, you and a friend may disagree about the
movie, and that friend then tries to point out something about the
movie that you had not considered. You may have read a newspaper or
magazine article that concluded some government policy ought to be
changed, or that one political candidate is better qualified than
another candidate. Even authors of text books may try to convince
you which theories are best.
For the next few minutes we would like you to think about three
occasions in the last few days when a someone tried to influence ~
of your opinions -- important or unimportant. For example, think
about some conversations you have had recently when you mildly or
sharply disagreed with another person. Think about some articles in
the papers or some theories in your texts you recently read. Think
about any occasions when someone tried to persuade you.
IN THE SPACES BELOW, PLEASE WRITE A SHORT SENTENCE OR TWO TO DESCRIBE
EACH OCCASION, and DESCRIBE HOW YOU FELT AT THAT TIME.
OCCASION 1:

OCCASION 2:

OCCASION 3:

*************PLEASE WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS*************
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With these occasions in mind, we would like you to indicate how
accurately a list of statements describes how you feel, in general,
whenever someone tries to persuade you.
We have included many
different statements to cover the many feelings you might have when
someone tries to persuade you.
You may find that some of these
statements describe how you feel very accurately, some only describe
you somewhat accurately, and some do not give an accurate description
of your feelings at all. Whether these statements describe you or
not, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you.
You can indicate how accurately each statement describes you by
using the following scale:
IN GENERAL, THIS STATEMENT DESCRIBES ME •..
l=VERY Accurately
2=FAIRLY Accurately
3=HARD TO SAY
4=FAIRLY Inaccurately
5=VERY Inaccurately
Please draw a circle around the one number that best describes how
accurately each statement describes you.
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01. Usually I've wanted to do the opposite
of what people try to convince me to
do.
In general, this statement describes me:
02. I sometimes do not trust my own judgment.

In general, this statement describes me:
03. When people try to change my mind, I
try hard to prevent them from accomp1 i shing it.
In general, this statement describes me:
04. After listening to someone, it is easy
for me to see things "in a new light."
In general, this statement describes me:
05. It is hard for me to see things from
someone else's point of view when they
are trying to convince me of something.
In general, this statement describes me:
06. Rather than listening while people are
talking to me, I am usually thinking of
things to rebut what they are saying.
In general, this statement describes me:
07. When listening to someone, I usually
realize that there can be more than one
correct opinion.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

-----------------------------------------------------~-----------

08. I am often surprised at how convincing
people can be.

In general, this statement describes me:
09. It is ~ important that people see
my point of view than it is for me to
see things from their point of view.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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10. Usually I've felt uncomfortable when
people try to convince me of their ideas.
In general, this statement describes me:
11. People often win me over to their point
of view.
In general, this statement describes me:
12. During discussions with people, I hold
onto my opinions more strongly than
most other people.
In general, this statement describes me:
13. I usually "give in" to people because I
eventually realize they are right.
In general, this statement describes me:
14. In most cases, changing my opinions is
better than hanging on to old opinions.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly 'Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly IQaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

-------~---------------------------------------------------------

15. I usually hold onto my opinions even
when other people hold the opposite
opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:
16. I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces
me to adopt a new opinion.
In general, this statement describes me:
17. It is important for me to share opinions
that are compatible with the opinions of
my friends.
In general, this statement describes me:
18. Changing my opinions makes me doubt my
integrity.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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19. I am usually uncomfortable when my
opinions are at odds with the opinions
of other people.
In general, this statement describes me:
20. Once I form an opinion, I frequently
wonder if my decision was correct.
In general, this statement describes me:
21. I am a better listener than leader.

In general, this statement describes me:
22. Many times I am

~ convinced that my
opinions are correct after someone tries
to change my mind.

In general, this statement describes me:
23. I put more trust in my judgment than in
the judgment of ~ people.
In general, this statement describes me:
24. I think that people who don't change
their opinions are usually stubborn.
In general, this statement describes me:
25. Compared to most people, I'm an independent, free-thinker.
In general, this statement describes me:
26. I think people who hold onto their
opinions are admirable.
In general, this statement describes me:
27. I believe it takes a strong person to
admit that their own opinions are
wrong.
In general, this statement describes me:

!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
!=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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28. When someone is trying to convince me of
something, I try hard to listen to what
they are saying.
In general, this statement describes me:
29. My opinions are very important to me.

In general, this statement describes me:
30. When people try to convince me of things,
they usually have good ideas.
In general, this statement describes me:
31. My opinions rarely change because they
are rarely wrong.
In general, this statement describes me:
32. I get defensive when people try to
change my opinions.
In general, this statement describes me:
33. I've found that I am usually correct if
I trust my own judgment.
In general, this statement describes me:
34. I believe that changing your opinions
is a sign of maturity.
In general, this statement describes me:
35. I think it is better to be open-minded
than it is to be strong-willed
In general, this statement describes me:
36. When listening to someone, I often begin
to rethink my position.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
S=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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37. I usually feel confident about my
beliefs.
In general, this statement describes me:
38. When listening to people, I usually learn
that an issue in nQ.t as simple or as
"black and white" as I first thought.
In general, this statement describes me:
39. My opinions usually turn out to be right.

In general, this statement describes me:
40. After listening to someone, it is easier
for me to see things "in a new light"
than it is for most other people.
In general, this statement describes me:
41. It is important for me to hold onto my
opinions.
In general, this statement describes me:
42. In a discussion, I probably change my
mind more easily than most people.
In general, this statement describes me:
43. It is important for me
persuade me.

~

to let people

In general, this statement describes me:

44.

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately .
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

----------------------------------------------------------------Many times my opinions may "bend but not
l=Very Accurately
break".
In general, this statement describes me:

45. I usually see if my opinions are reasonable by listening to what other people
are saying.
In general, this statement describes ae:

2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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46. People think I am stubborn.

In general, this statement describes me:
47. I usually feel like I've improved myself
if I form a new opinion, and get rid of
an old one.
In general, this statement describes me:
48. I sometimes worry when my beliefs are
different than the beliefs of most
people.
In general, this statement describes me:
49. It bothers me to change my opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:
50. It is sometimes better to tr~st the
judgment of Q.thgr people than to rely
on my own feelings.
In general, this statement describes me:
51. In a discussion, I am more open-minded
than most people.
In general, this statement describes me:
52. I think that people who change their
opinions are usually weak.
In general, this statement describes me:
53. I almost always believe that my opinions
are correct.
In general, this statement describes me:
54. I think people who hold onto their
opinions have strong characters.
In general, this statement describes me:

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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55. When I disagree with someone, I rarely
change my mind because they are usually
wrong.
In general, this statement describes me:
56. I usually listen to the opinions of
people I like.
In general, this statement describes me:
57. I believe it takes a strong person to
admit that someone else's opinions are
right.
In general, this statement describes me:
58. I usually trust that my own opinions are
right, even when people try to change my
mind.
In general, this statement describes me:
59. In a discussion, I usually work hard
to hold onto my beliefs.
In general,· this statement describes me:
60. I think that changing your opinions is
a sign of open-mindedness.
In general, this statement describes me:
61, I am usually an assertive person.

In general, this statement describes me:
62. Changing my opinions is no big deal.

In general, this statement describes me:
63. GENDER: (circle one)

l. Male
2. Female

l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
l=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
J=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
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Phillips Persuasibility Inventory
PPI
on the following pages are 42 statements. The best answer to each
statement is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many
opposing and different points of view.
You may find yourself
strongly agreeing with some of the statements, disagreeing just as
strongly with some, and perhaps less certain about others. Whether
you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many
people feel the same as you do.
Draw a circle around the number in the left margin preceding each
statement according to how you agree or disagree with it. Please
circle one nuinber for each statement.
·
6: I AGREE VERY MUCH
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE
4: I AGREE A LITTLE

3: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays
aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

2)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I

3)

6 5 4 3 2 1

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly
refuses to admit he or she is wrong.

4)

6 5 4 3 2 1

There are two kinds of people in this world;
those who are for the truth and those who are
against the truth.

5)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I would like to see the inflation and energy
problems solved soon.

6)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Once I start a task, I don't 1 ike to start
another until I finish the first one.

7)

6 5 4 3 2 1

People just don't know what's good for them.

8)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I must justify my actions in the pursuit of
my own interests.

9)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Of all the different philosophies which exist
in this world, there is probably only one
which is correct.

10)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Before any important
long it will take.

11)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I would support a large city-income tax which
placed a heavy burden on me.

12)

6 5 4 3 2 1

The highest fonn of government is a democracy, and the highest form of democracy is a
goverrutent run by the JIOSt intelligent people

do what others expect of me.

job,

I

must know how
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6: I AGREE VERY MUCH
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE
4: I AGREE A LITTLE

J:

I DISAGREE A LITTLE

2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

13)

654321

The United States and Russia have just about
nothing in common.

14)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I live by the rules and standards of society.

15)

6 5 4 3 2 1

In a problem-solving group it is always best
to systematically attack the problem.

16)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I'd like it if I could find someone who would
tell me how to solve my personal problems.

17)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Proper rest is necessary for good health.

18)

6 5 4 3 2 1

In this complicated world of ours the only
way we can know what's going on is to rely on
leaders or experts who can be trusted.

19)

654321

A problem has little attraction for me if I
don't think it has a solution.

20)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Reasons are needed to justify my feelings.

21)

6 5 4 3 2 1

People on their own are helpless and miserable creatures.

22)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I do not like to get started
projects unless I feel assured
project will be successful.

2J)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Education is a waste of time for children;
they should be free to do as they want.

24)

6 5 4 3 2 1

It's only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

25)

6 5 4 3 2 1

In a decision-making situation in which there
is not enough information to process the
problem, I feel very uncomfortable.
·

26)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I only feel free to express warm feelings to
my friends.

27)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Most people just don't give a damn for others

28)

6 5 4 3 2 1

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the
betrayal of our own side.

29)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Moderation

in

most

activities

perfect rule, but it's a good one.

in group
that the

is

not

a
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6: I AGREE VERY MUCH
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE
4: I AGREE A LITTLE

3: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

30)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I don't like to work on a problem unless
there is a possibility of coming out with a
clear-cut and unambiguous answer.

31)

6 5 4 3 2 1

It is often desirable to reserve judg111ent
about what's going on until one has had the
chance to hear the opinions of those one
respects.

32)

6 5 4 3 2 1

I will continue to grow only by setting my
sights on a high-level, socially approved
goal.

33) 6 5 4 3 2 1

The present is all too full of unhap~iness.
It is only the future that counts.

34)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Complex problems appeal to me only if I have
a clear idea of the total scope of the
problem.

35)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Highway speed limits should be raised to 100
miles per hour, even if 10 times as many
people get killed.

36)

6 5 4 3 2 1

In a discussion I often find it necessary to
repeat myself several times to make sure I am
being understood.

37)

654321

While I don't like to admit this even to
myself, my secret ambition is ~ become a
great person
like Einstein,
Shakespeare,
Beethoven, or Madam Curie, Eleanor Roosevelt,
or Susan B. Anthony.

38)

6 5 4 3 2 1

People should always control their anger.

39)

6 5 4 3 2 1

A group meeting
definite agenda.

40)

6 5 4 3 2 1

Even though freedom of speech for all groups
is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately
necessary to restrict the freedom of certain
political groups.

41)

6 5 4 3 2 1

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a
live coward.

42)

6 5 4 3 2 1

The main thing in life is for a
want to do something important.

functions

best

with

a

person to
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Janis & Field Persuasibility Questionnaire
JFPQ

Please answer the following questions
in a way that best ~escribes you.
======-=----------~~-~--~--~--~----~--~~~----~~----

1) How often do you change your
opinion if you discover that
most of the people you know do
not share your point of view?

O=
1=
2=
3=
4=
5=

Less than 1 ti:ae in 5
About 1 time out of 5
About 2 times out of 5
About 3 times out of 5
About 4 times out of 5
More than 4 times in 5

2) When one of you friends wants
to convince you of his point
of view, does he usually have
a hard time or an easy time?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

An Extremely Hard time
A Moderately Hard time
A Slightly Hard ti:me
A Slightly Easy time
A Moderately Easy time
An Extremely Easy time

3) As compared with the average
person your own age, how much
are you usually influenced by
the ideas expressed by your
friends?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

Very Infrequently
Infrequently
Somewhat Infrequently
Somewhat Frequently
Frequently
Very Frequently

4) As coapared with the average
person your age, how strongly
do you usually hang onto your
own opinions at ti:aes when
your friends are trying to
get you to change your aind?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

Very Strongly
Strongly
Soaewhat Strongly
Somewhat Mildly
Mildly
Very Mildly

5) How easy is it for your friends
to get you to do what they want
you to do?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

It's
It's
It's
It's
It's
It's

6) When other people criticize
your ideas or object to your
opinion, how often do you end
up feeling that they are right
and you are wrong?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

Very Infrequent~y
Infrequently
Somewhat Infrequently
Somewhat Frequently
Frequently
Very Frequently

7) How often do you becoae uneasy
when the opinion of one of your
friends is different fro• your
own on so:ae important topic?

O=
l=
2=
3=
4=
5=

Very Infrequently
Infrequently
Somewhat Infrequently
Somewhat Frequently
Frequently
Very Frequently

Very Difficult
Difficult
Somewhat Difficult
Somewhat Easy
Easy
Very Easy
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8) How often do you feel sure you
know what is right or wrong
about the ideas expressed by
the people you know?

O= Very Infrequently
l= Infrequently
2= Somewhat Infrequently
J= Somewhat Frequently
4= Frequently
5= Very Frequently

9) How regularly do you agree or disagree with the articles that
you read in newspapers and magazines?
1
2

I
I
I
I
I

J

4
5
10)

Nowadays when people listen to the radio or watch 'rV, they
hear a great deal of advertising, publicity, and information
that attempts to influence their opinions.
When compared to
the average person your own age, how •uch are your own· ideas
influence by the things you hear on the radio or 'rV?
I
I
3
I
4
I
5 = I
6
I
7
I
1
2

11)

Agree with practically everything I read.
Agree with most of the things I read.
Agree with about half and Disagree with about half.
Disagree with most of the things I read.
Disagree with practically everything I read.

all

am
a•
am
a•
am
all

much more influenced than the average person.
somewhat more influenced.
slightly more influenced.
influenced about as •uch as the average person.
slightly less influenced.
somewhat less influenced.
•uch less influenced than the average person.

Consider all the •agazine articles and newspaper col Wills
presenting a specific point of view which you :aay have read
during the past year.
About how aany of the• 11a.y have
influenced your opinions?
1
2
3
.4
5
6

=

Practically none of the•.
Very few of the•.
Some of the• .
A fairly large nWl.ber
Most of the•.
Practically all of the•.
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